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ABSTRACT 
As methods of family formation have expanded and family forms have proliferated, 
courts and legislatures have struggled with how to define the boundaries of legal parentage for 
children conceived with sperm provided by someone known to the intended parent. This article 
surveys the existing approaches, identifies the boundaries that have been drawn and offers a 
critique of those boundaries in order to develop a pluralistic regime that better reflects the variety 
of ways these families are formed and how they operate. In the process, the article identifies a set 
of core values that should guide any framework for assigning rights, responsibilities and status 
for families created with known sperm providers. It then elucidates a series of essential principles 
that should govern. The article argues that the law should not discriminate against non-
traditional parents, that it should expand beyond the binary categories of “parent” and “donor” 
to accommodate the active sperm provider, and that it should open the door to multiple parent 
families. To facilitate these goals, the article further argues that the law should encourage written 
expressions of intent while preserving the possibility of functional parenting and setting forth 
clear default rules.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Jason Patric provided sperm so his one-time girlfriend, Danielle, could conceive a child. 
He later sued to establish paternity and won.
1
 William Marotta answered a Craigslist ad from a 
lesbian couple seeking a sperm donor so they could have a child. When the couple split and fell 
on hard times financially, the state of Kansas sought to establish Marotta’s paternity and compel 
him to pay child support. The trial court agreed with the state, and the appeal is pending.
2
 J. S. and 
V.K., a married, same-sex couple from Massachusetts, ran into difficulty when they sought to 
complete an adoption of their child conceived with sperm donated by V.K.’s brother and carried 
to term by J.S. The trial court insisted that V.K.’s brother receive notice of the pending adoption. 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that he was a donor and thus not entitled to notice.
3
 
In Virginia, Joyce Bruce asked a friend, Robert Boardwine, to help her conceive a child. She 
performed the insemination at home. When the two disagreed about the role he was to play in the 
child’s life, Boardwine sued for paternity and won.
4
 
These four recent cases are among the latest examples of directed donation
5
 cases gone 
                                                                
1
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
2
 Michael Winter, Kansas Sperm Donor To Appeal Ruling Over Child Support, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/23/kansas-sperm-donor-lesbians-child-support/4807873/; Chandrika 
Narayan, Kansas Court Says Sperm Donor Must Pay Child Support, CNN (Jan. 4, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/23/justice/kansas-sperm-donation/. 
3
 In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d 830, 837 (Mass. 2015). 
4
 Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 778 (Va. Ct. App. 2015). 
5
 A note about terminology: Although I have used the term “directed donation,” I do not mean to imply that 
the provision of sperm necessarily reflects a donation in the legal sense. One of the problems with the law, as we shall see, 
is that statutes often refer to any provision of sperm (or eggs) by one party to another as a donation and describe the 
provider as a donor, simultaneously implying that the provider does not intend to parent the child and determining that the 
provider is nothing more than a donor legally. As we will see, this assumption is at times incorrect. Hence I will reserve 
the term donor to describe those who have no intent to parent. However, for ease of syntax, I will continue to use “directed 
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awry, but they surely will not be the last. As methods of family formation have expanded and 
family forms have proliferated, courts and legislatures have struggled with how to define the 
boundaries of legal parentage for children conceived with gametes provided by someone known 
to the intended parent(s). Most of the legal developments and controversies have involved 
directed sperm donation, and that will be my focus here.
6
 
Scholars have been advocating for more than twenty-five years for laws that 
appropriately meet the needs of these families.
7
 Yet the legal landscape governing the status of 
gamete donors remains an inconsistent patchwork of statutes and case law that too often leaves 
families in a state of uncertainty or battling in court. In some cases, these laws reflect efforts to 
resolve modern-day disputes with laws designed for families in an age before the explosion of 
family forms and the growth of assisted reproduction. Others are of more modern vintage, but still 
fail to provide a legal regime that adequately or coherently addresses the varied needs of families 
using sperm from someone known to them. 
Most states have adopted statutes that, at a minimum, address the rights of married 
women who use donor sperm. These statutes uniformly provide that a husband who consents to 
the insemination of his wife by a physician is deemed the legal parent of any resulting child.
8
 
State statutes also typically make clear that a donor who provides semen to a licensed physician 
for use in artificial insemination of someone other than his wife is not considered a legal father of 
the child.
9
 Some of the statutes classify the sperm provider as donor regardless of the marital 
                                                                
donation” as a neutral term to describe non-anonymous use of gametes by another, without intending a value or legal 
judgment about the status of the provider.  
6
 There have been a few cases involving known egg providers. In these cases, one partner provides eggs to 
conceive a child through IVF, which is carried to term by the other partner. In all the cases, the court found that both 
women were legal parents to the resulting children. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682-83 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 
2009); K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 64 (Cal. 2005); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 327 (Fla. 2013); St. Mary v. 
Damon, 309 P.3d 1027, 1032 (Nev. 2013) (remanding for factual determination of intent where genetic mother claimed 
former partner was acting as surrogate despite co-parenting contract). 
7
 See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian 
Families: When Semen Donors Are Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57 (2000); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by 
Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599-600 (2002). 
8
 ALA. CODE § 26-17-703 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2015); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) 
(West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(1) (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-771(b), 45a-774 (West 
2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(1) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
5405(3) (West 2015); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(a) (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2302 (West 2015); MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(1) (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
210.824(1) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(a) (McKinney 2015); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49A-1 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-63(705)(1) (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3111.95(A) (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10, § 552 (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.243 (West 
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-15-703 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(a)(2) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101(7) (West 
2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-905(b)(i) (West 2015). Some states have 
reached the same result by case law. See e.g., In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877 (S.C. 1987). 
9
 ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (LexisNexis 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West 2015); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 
2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(1) (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(2) (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
210.824(2) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (West 2015); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95(B) (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.239 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
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status of the recipient.
10
 Many of these statutes derived from the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 
(“UPA”).
11
 
Outside of the opposite-sex marriage context, state laws diverge. Some jurisdictions have 
adopted an “opt-in” system, where sperm providers for assisted reproduction are considered 
donors with no parental rights unless the provider and recipient expressly agree otherwise.
12
 One 
jurisdiction has adopted an “opt-out” system by case law, where the presumption is reversed: 
sperm providers are considered parents, with full parental rights and responsibilities, unless the 
provider and recipient expressly agree otherwise.
13
 Yet other states have adopted a version of the 
UPA revised in 2002, which uses intent to distinguish parents from donors.
14
 The revised UPA 
also no longer requires the donor to provide the sperm to a licensed physician to be considered a 
non-parent,
15
 though statutory versions often retain the requirement.
16
 
Even where the rule seems straightforward enough, complications ensue when the 
conduct of the parties creates ambiguity about the role of the gamete provider in the child’s life. 
In cases such as Jason P. v. Danielle S., courts have stoked controversy by opening the door to 
recharacterization of the gamete provider from donor to parent based on post-birth conduct.
17
 
Other cases have arisen because the existing law, even when it is clear, is too narrow to 
encompass the diversity of family forms using gametes provided by others to create their families. 
Despite the disparate approaches taken by the statutes and case law, they share some 
common features. For the most part, they reflect a binary approach to categorizing gamete 
providers. Laws addressing the use of gametes thus far uniformly adhere to an all-or-nothing 
                                                                
160.702 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (West 2015); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101(7) (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 
(West 2015).  
10
 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-702 (West 2015); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(1) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 
2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95(B) (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 109.239 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (West 
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
902 (West 2015).  
11
 See Parentage Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2015), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600–7671 (West 
2015). 
12
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 16-909(e)(2) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2301 
(West 2015); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(b) (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §9:17-44(b) (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.705 
(West 2015). 
13
 See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007). 
14
 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702–704 cmt. 63–64 (amended 2000); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 
(West 2015). 
15
 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. 63 (amended 2000); see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2015). 
16
 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.011(4)(a) (West 
2015) (defining assisted reproduction as a “method of causing pregnancy other than through sexual intercourse,” including 
“artificial insemination”).  
17
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 796-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
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status determination: gamete providers are either legal parents, with all of the rights and 
responsibilities that inhere in that status, or they are donors—legal strangers to their offspring. 
The law also continues to presume that only two people can fill the role of parent. 
Beyond these problematic points of commonality, the boundaries between “donor” and 
“parent” vary. Two boundaries in particular stand out and have already been noted. First, many 
statutes focus on marital status. These laws often address only the use of donated sperm by 
married couples, leaving everyone else at risk of a determination that all sperm providers to 
unmarried women are parents. Second, many statutes and cases make physician involvement the 
critical determinant of status.
18
 
The existing law’s rigid adherence to a binary structure, refusal to recognize more than 
two parents, and assignment of rights based on marital status and physician involvement create 
serious problems. Chief among them is that they leave too many families and donors in limbo, 
that they compel some families to conform to a model at odds with their intent or daily reality, 
and that they leave participants in a knowledge vacuum, without adequate tools to effectuate their 
intentions.
19
 It is time to consider a new legal framework, and in this article I take up that 
challenge. In doing so, I will build on a rich body of scholarship that has sought to explain the 
conceptual underpinnings of family law, though I will not attempt, as some have ably done,
20
 to 
uncover a unifying theory of parentage law. Rather, my approach is pragmatic, seeking to 
integrate insights from these various approaches in a way that captures the needs of the wide 
variety of families created through directed donation. 
This paper will begin in Part I by laying out a taxonomy of cases involving sperm 
provided by one party for use by another. The cases that have arisen reveal some recurring factual 
patterns, but also hint at the considerable diversity of family forms created through directed 
donation. This part surveys the existing legal approaches, identifies the boundaries that have been 
drawn, and offers a critique of those boundaries in order to develop a pluralistic regime that better 
reflects the various ways these families are formed and how they operate. 
Having thoroughly elucidated the features and problems that inhere in the current 
system, Part II considers the values and corollary principles that should guide any framework for 
assigning rights, responsibilities, and status for families created with known sperm providers. I 
begin by identifying the five values that should underlie the new framework: child welfare, 
parental rights, pluralism, coherence with the broader realm of family law, and functionality—
ensuring that the rules operate effectively for those subject to them. This section then proceeds to 
                                                                
18
 ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-702, 26-17-704 (2015); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 45a-771a(1) (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 16-401(1) (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.13(1) (West 2015); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 39-5402 (West 2015); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 
2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:17-44 (West 2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 
(McKinney 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.90 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551 (West 2015); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 677.360 (West 2015); WIS. STAT ANN. § 891.40 (West 2015); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 
530, 537-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1260-61 (Ind. App. 2010). 
19
 The disconnect between the law and the reality of family life for lesbian couple-headed households is not 
unique to the United States. See Fiona Kelly, (Re)forming Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal Parentage Within 
Planned Lesbian Families, 40 OTTAWA L. REV. 185, 194 (2008-09) (studying lesbian mothers in Canada and finding a 
perception that “their familial definitions were rarely reflected within the law.”). 
20
 E.g., Storrow, supra note 7, at 643 (arguing for a framework that bases parenthood on pure intention); 
Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 648 (2014) 
(arguing for a labor-based theory of parentage). 
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generate a comprehensive set of principles governing directed sperm donation that honors both 
the intentions and the reality of the broad variety of families using directed sperm donation. More 
specifically, I argue for protecting non-traditional parents, for expanded recognition of sperm 
providers who play a significant role in the child’s life and for families with more than two 
parents, and for legal recognition for those sperm providers who actually function as parents. 
Part IV concludes with a call for further discussion and reform and for a legal regime 
that comports with these values and principles. Creating such a legal regime will defy easy 
resolution. It will force us to consider the apparent tension between intent-based parentage and 
functional parentage and require tempering the aspirational with the realistic. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF THE CASES 
A. Who Is Using Sperm From Known Providers? 
No data exists about the number of women using gametes from others to conceive 
children, but some estimate that 80,000 to 90,000 donor inseminations and 15,000 donor egg 
cycles take place each year.
21
 Sources also estimate that anywhere from 30,000 to 60,000 donor-
conceived children are born each year.
22
 Most recipients likely obtain those gametes from 
anonymous sources, whether a sperm bank, an egg donor agency, or the growing number of egg 
banks. There is no reliable data on how many people use sperm from known donors, but the 
practice likely is not rare, as approximately thirty published appellate decisions address questions 
raised by directed donation. 
A close look at these cases reveals the range of family forms created through sperm 
donation as well as the struggles that have arisen for families and courts when disputes develop 
over who has parental rights and responsibilities. No reported cases involve a dispute between a 
known sperm provider and a “traditional” family in the historic sense—a heterosexual married 
couple using a known donor to conceive a child to be raised exclusively by the couple as their 
own. Heterosexual married couples generally look to sperm donation because of medical 
infertility issues and use sperm donated anonymously.
23
 Moreover, the number of opposite-sex 
couples requiring sperm donation has dropped dramatically because of advances in fertility 
techniques for treating male factor infertility.
24
 
The problems arise, then, in the use of sperm from known providers to single women and 
lesbian couples. The intent of the individuals participating in this method of family formation and 
                                                                
21
 LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING OUR WORLD 
94 (2008). 
22
 The data on the number of donor-conceived children is sketchy, at best. See Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm 
Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html?_r=0 (stating 
that 30,000 to 60,000 donor-conceived children are born yearly); MUNDY, supra note 21, at 94 (asserting that 30,000 
donor-conceived children are born each year). 
23
 But see Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (involving a friend of the 
husband and wife who provided sperm for insemination); In re Marriage of A.C.H., 210 P.3d 929, 931 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) 
(concerning a wife who used sperm from a “private semen donor” located by friend). 
24
 NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES 14 (2013); Marsha 
Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 835, 846 (2000).  
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the nature of the families they actually create surely are as diverse as the people themselves. But it 
is possible to identify some common categories: single women who wish to parent entirely alone, 
without any donor involvement; single women who wish to enjoy exclusive legal parenthood, but 
desire some donor involvement in the child’s life; and single women who may—or may not—be 
“single” in the romantic sense, but wish to raise the child with the sperm provider as a co-parent. 
This latter category may include women who are in a relationship with the donor, i.e. an 
unmarried couple that needs fertility treatment to conceive. Indeed, even among the previous 
categories, the woman may have enjoyed a romantic relationship with the sperm provider. We 
also need to keep in mind that the family structure as originally contemplated may change over 
time.
25
 
As with single women, some lesbian couples may desire to parent exclusively, without 
any donor involvement; others may desire some donor involvement in the child’s life short of 
parental status; while yet others may desire to parent with the sperm provider and perhaps even 
with the sperm provider’s partner. To further complicate the landscape, some lesbian couples are 
now married, while others are not. 
Most of these family configurations can be found in the reported cases that have arisen, 
but they do not comprise the whole universe. I have received queries from physicians who have 
been asked by married women who are separated or contemplating divorce to conceive using 
sperm from another man.
26
 It takes little imagination to conjure other possibilities as well. Given 
this plethora of family forms, can the law do justice for them all? Certainly our existing options 
have fallen woefully short. As the case survey that follows amply demonstrates, families using 
sperm from known providers live either in a world of uncertainty or in a world that fails to protect 
the family choices they have made. 
B. An Overview of the Cases 
1. Single Women 
Nearly half of the reported cases involve single women. In most of these cases, the sperm 
provider was a friend or acquaintance of the mother,
27
 but in about one-third of them, the mother 
                                                                
25
 It’s not just in the movies that the mother marries the sperm donor. A woman who conceived a child with 
sperm from an anonymous donor met the donor when the child was 10 months old. The two fell in love, had a second 
child, and are now seeking to establish the donor’s legal parentage of the first child. Sperm Donor Romance: Victorian 
Government Slates Review Into Adoption as Stories of ‘Unconventional’ Families Challenge Current System, ABC NEWS 
(Mar. 1, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-02/sperm-donor-family-victoria-adoption-
review/6272426. For the movie version of the scenario, see The Switch, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Switch_%282010_film%29 (last visited May 19, 2015) (discussing the film The Switch). 
26
 Perhaps this is not surprising. In some of the reported cases, the sperm provider was married to someone 
else at the time he helped the mother conceive, see In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840, 842 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) 
and Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 319, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), so why shouldn’t the mother be married? 
27
 In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 27−28 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (asserting that the sperm provider 
described the relationship between the sperm donor and mother as “friends,” but the mother described their relationship as 
“acquaintances”); Brown v. Gadson, 654 S.E.2d 179, 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 
2007); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1989); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005); Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 775 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2015). 
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and sperm provider had been in a romantic relationship at some point or were still in a 
relationship at the time of conception or birth of the child.
28
 
The role the sperm provider was expected to play in the child’s life in these cases was 
sometimes clear, at least at the outset. In three of the cases, the court honored those intentions one 
way or another. In two, the parties had entered into a written agreement describing the sperm 
provider as a donor, and in which he relinquished all his rights.
29
 In the third case, Ferguson v. 
McKiernan, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an oral agreement that the provider would be 
a donor and denied the mother’s petition to establish paternity and obtain child support.
30
 
In two other cases where the intentions were clear, but in the opposite direction, the court 
also ruled consistently with the agreements. In In re Sullivan, the mother and sperm provider 
signed a co-parenting contract prior to the insemination, agreeing that both would act as parents, 
and the court found the sperm provider had standing to pursue a paternity action.
31
 Similarly, in 
L.F. v. Breit, various writings, as well as the parties’ conduct, evidenced clear intent for the sperm 
provider to parent. The parties, who were in a long-term relationship, went through two cycles of 
IVF together, which the sperm provider attended; they signed a written custody and visitation 
agreement as well as a voluntary declaration of paternity; and the sperm provider was listed as the 
father on the birth certificate. They also lived together for four months following the birth, and the 
father continued to visit until the mother cut him off when the child was a year old.
32
  
Acknowledging that despite all the evidence of the parties’ intent, the father would merely be a 
donor under Virginia’s artificial insemination statute, the Virginia Supreme Court nonetheless 
held in his favor, finding that the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity established his paternity. 
To rule otherwise would violate the father’s constitutional rights.
33
 
However, not all courts have respected the parties’ clear intention. In E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 
the mother and donor signed a contract purporting to terminate the donor’s parental rights.
34
 
When they sought a court order effectuating that intention, the court denied it because New Jersey 
law did not allow the termination of parental rights by contract, and the mother’s in-home 
insemination failed to comply with the New Jersey artificial insemination statute. The statute 
required physician involvement to extinguish the sperm provider’s rights.
35
 
More often, the parties’ intentions were considerably murkier. In some cases, the dispute 
                                                                
28
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
484; C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ill. 
2003); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 715 (Va. 2013); In re 
Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840, 842 (Wash. 2005). In B.W.P. v. A.L.H., 155 So. 3d 1229, 1229–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015), the facts did not reveal how the mother and sperm provider knew each other.  
29
 Brown, 654 S.E.2d at 180; Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (both 
applying Florida law).  
30
 Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1248. 
31
 In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). The court did not base its ruling specifically 
on the contract nor decide whether the contract was enforceable.  
32
 Breit, 736 S.E.2d at 715. 
33
 Id. at 722. 
34
 E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011). 
35
 Id. at 1174.  
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over intentions erupted relatively soon after the child’s birth. In In re K.M.H, the mother solicited 
a friend to provide sperm for her to conceive a child.
36
 On the second attempt, she conceived 
twins, using a physician to perform the insemination. Two days after the births, she filed a 
petition to terminate the sperm provider’s parental rights. He responded with a paternity action, 
alleging an oral agreement that he would be a parent to the twins. The court ruled for the mother 
based on the Kansas insemination statute, which provides that donors are not parents unless they 
have executed a written agreement to the contrary.
37
 
Another case where the situation deteriorated rather quickly exemplifies how failure to 
clarify intentions can lead to trouble. In Bruce v. Boardwine, the parties talked about having a 
written agreement, but never followed through.
38
 Bruce told Boardwine she “trusted him and, if it 
worked, they could ‘talk about it some more.’”
39
 Apparently, they never discussed his role.
40
 
Bruce testified that she expected Boardwine to visit and be involved with the child as “other 
friends” were, but that she did not expect him to see the child without her or that he would have 
formal visitation. She wanted to be the “sole parent.”
41
 Boardwine claimed that he agreed that 
Bruce would be the sole parent, but that he intended “to always be involved” with the child, that 
he would have the opportunity to see the child “as little or as much as he wanted,” and that he 
expected to participate in the child’s life by attending athletic activities and “being involved in the 
child’s educational and health decisions.”
42
 Hence although the parties seemed to agree on formal 
parentage, they disagreed about the exact nature of Boardwine’s role in the child’s life. While 
“being involved” with the child could describe many adults in the child’s life, “decision-making” 
sounds distinctly parental. 
The court ruled in Boardwine’s favor, not based on the parties’ intent, but because of the 
method of conception. Bruce performed the artificial insemination herself at home with the aid of 
a turkey baster.
43
 The court held that Virginia’s assisted reproduction statute, which would have 
classified Boardwine as a donor, did not apply because turkey-baster insemination did not qualify 
as “assisted conception” under the statute.
44
 Assisted reproduction encompassed pregnancies 
“resulting from any intervening medical technology.”
45
 Although the list of such treatments 
included “artificial insemination by donor,” the court did not consider the use of a kitchen 
implement comparable to the other types of intervention listed in the statute, such as IVF. 
In other cases, the claims regarding intent strain credulity and seem almost beside the 
point. In Ryan v. Wright, the parties had a twenty year on-again, off-again relationship that 
                                                                
36
 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007).  
37
 Id. at 1029, 1045.  
38
 Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 775 (Va. Ct. App. 2015).  
39
 Id.  
40
 Id.  
41
 Id.  
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. at 777. 
45
 Id. at 776 (internal quotations omitted).  
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produced two children by fertility treatments and artificial insemination.
46
 The mother claimed 
that the two had an oral agreement that Ryan would be a sperm donor. Ryan denied any 
agreement, and the parties were living together at the time the children were conceived and born. 
Indeed, they apparently broke up because they could not agree on whether to have more children. 
Not surprisingly, the court found no valid oral contract and no intent by Ryan to relinquish 
parental rights.
47
 
A claim of donor status was similarly far-fetched in In re Parentage of J.M.K.
48
 In 
J.M.K. the parties had no written agreement to share parentage and disputed their intentions 
regarding the two children born using sperm from Kepl, a man with whom the mother had a 
lengthy extramarital relationship.
49
 Kepl and the mother first attempted conception via sexual 
intercourse, and then underwent multiple fertility treatments. Two children eventually resulted 
from IVF. The parties’ conduct strongly evinced an intention to share parentage regarding the first 
child. Kepl signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (VAP) after the birth of the first child 
and acted in all ways as a parent—visiting weekly, traveling together on vacation, participating in 
holiday events and providing financial support. The record also contained professional photos of 
the three “posed as a traditional family.”
50
 
Under these circumstances, there seems little room for disagreement regarding Kepl’s 
status as parent to the first child. However, the parties disputed the intent regarding the birth of 
the second child. Kepl did not sign a VAP for the second child and ceased support for both 
children. Moreover, during the litigation, he claimed that he donated as a “friend” and never 
intended to parent either child. He further asserted that he provided support and signed the VAP 
to continue his sexual relationship with the mother and because the mother was threatening to 
disclose the affair to his wife.
51
 Kepl’s disavowal of the second child seems highly suspect in light 
of the family’s history. 
The court ruled that Kepl was a father of the first child based on execution of the VAP.
52
 
It then went on to find paternity for the second child based on blood test results.
53
 The 
insemination statute, which would have rendered him a donor, was held inapplicable because the 
sperm was provided for IVF, rather than artificial insemination.
54
 
The statutory context clearly can be critical to the outcome, and the common requirement 
that the parties use a physician to ensure donor status has led to conflicting court rulings when the 
sperm provider intends to be a parent. As we saw with Breit, where the intentions were clear that 
the sperm provider intended to be a parent, the court ruled that strict application of the donor 
                                                                
46
 Ryan v. Wright, 872 N.W.2d 410, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (final publication decision pending). 
47
 Id. 
48
 In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840, 842–43 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 843. 
52
 Id. at 848.  
53
 Id. at 850. 
54
 Id. at 849. 
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statute would raise constitutional concerns.
55
 
Oregon reached a similar conclusion where the sperm provider and mother disagreed 
about the intent regarding parentage. In McIntyre v. Crouch, the sperm provider alleged that he 
gave the semen in reliance on an agreement with the mother that he “would remain active” in the 
child’s life and have monthly and summer visitation rights.
56
 The mother denied those assertions 
and relied on the Oregon insemination statute, which like Section 5 of the UPA, extinguished the 
rights of donors of semen provided to physicians, to oppose his paternity petition. The court found 
that the statute did apply to bar a sperm provider’s claim for paternity, even though the semen was 
not provided under the supervision of a physician, as the statute stated.
57
 However, the court went 
on to determine that application would be an unconstitutional violation of the sperm provider’s 
due process rights if the sperm provider could prove that he donated in reliance on an agreement 
to be a parent.
58
 
In In re R.C., the Colorado Supreme Court considered the same issue but used statutory 
interpretation to avoid the constitutional question. It found in favor of a sperm provider seeking an 
opportunity to show that he and the mother agreed that he would be a father if the insemination 
were successful.
59
 Although Colorado had adopted Section 5 of the UPA, extinguishing rights of 
sperm donors who provide sperm through a physician to a non-spouse, the court held that the 
statute did not apply if the sperm provider could prove, as alleged, that he donated with intent to 
parent.
60
 Thus both McIntyre and R.C. preserved the sperm provider’s right to try to prove that he 
should be considered a parent, though they reached that result via different routes. We will 
consider two California cases that yielded conflicting rulings when addressing clashes of 
intentions and application of the UPA in depth in section IIID infra.
61
 
Finally, in the earliest case to consider the issue, C.M. v. C.C., a New Jersey trial court 
found a man who provided sperm for insemination of a friend to be a father.
62
 The parties 
disputed the role the man was to play: he expected to be a father, but she viewed him as “only a 
visitor” like her other friends.
63
 In the absence of any case law or statutory authority, the court 
                                                                
55
 L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 715, 721–22 (Va. 2013). For two other cases that considered the 
constitutional implications of ignoring the sperm provider’s intent, see Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 
WL 4636692, at *1, 6, 8, 9–10 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) and C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524–25 (Ohio Misc. 1994). 
Compare with B.W.P. v. A.L.H., 155 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), where the court, in considering a claim 
for attorney’s fees for a mother who defended a paternity action brought by the sperm donor, denied the fee award because 
the donor attempted to advance novel questions of law regarding constitutionality of donor statute and availability of 
equitable estoppel, thus implying the donor’s efforts were unsuccessful (the court provided no facts or specifics of the 
claim). 
56
 McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). 
57
 Id. at 242–43.  
58
 Id. at 244. 
59
 In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989). 
60
 Id. 
61
 Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 484−88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) and Jason P. v. Danielle S., 
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) are discussed in detail infra at notes 254-60 and accompanying text. 
62
 C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977). 
63
 Id. at 822. 
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found no reason to distinguish this case from the traditional rule regarding unwed fathers who 
conceived sexually and artificial insemination cases where the husband consents to the 
insemination of his wife and thereby becomes the father.
64
 
2. Lesbian Couples 
The majority of cases involve lesbian couples using a known sperm provider to create 
their families.
65
 Several features of these cases stand out. First, as with the cases involving single 
women, in many of these cases, the insemination took place at home, not in a doctor’s office.
66
 
And like the cases involving single women, in some, this fact was determinative. For example, in 
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., the California appellate court recognized the paternity of the sperm 
provider because he had not provided the sperm through a licensed physician as required by the 
insemination statute.
67
 In C.O. v. W.S., although the parties disputed whether the insemination 
occurred under the supervision of a physician, the court likewise ruled that Ohio’s insemination 
statute required physician involvement.
68
 Though as we saw in some of the single women cases,
69
 
the court opined that even if the parties had complied with the statute, it might not apply where 
the parties agreed the sperm provider would parent, and might even be unconstitutional under 
those circumstances.
70
 The trial court’s decision in the Marotta case (involving the Craigslist 
sperm donor) also rested on failure to comply with the physician requirement in ruling he was a 
father obligated to pay child support.
71
 
Second, most of the lesbian couple cases, including Jhordan and C.O, contemplated 
some involvement by the donor. In Jhordan, although the couple disputed their intentions 
regarding the role the sperm provider was expected to play, he visited the child in the hospital and 
on a monthly basis after that; he bought baby items and started a trust fund for the child; and he 
                                                                
64
 Id. at 824. 
65
 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App 3d. 386, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Browne v. D’Alleva, 
No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 762 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2013); In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 
N.E.3d 830, 832 (Mass. 2015); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 
P.3d 861, 862 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); Tripp v. Hinckley, 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Thomas S. v. 
Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994); 
Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007); In re B.N.L.-B, 375 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tex. App. 2012); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tex. App. 2006); In re 
Madrone, 350 P.3d 495, 496 (Or. Ct. App. 2015); W.R.L. v. A.H., No. 2014-CA-001240-ME, 2015 WL 1746240, at *2 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2015); Kansas ex rel. Sec’y Dep’t for Child. & Fam. v. W.M., No. 12D2686, *2 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 2014). 
66
 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532; A.A.B., 112 So.3d at 762; See M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1260; Mintz, 198 
P.3d at 862; Tripp, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 507; Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357; Leckie, 875 P.2d at 522; Kansas ex rel., No. 
12D2686 at *2. 
67
 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 531. 
68
 C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
69
 See supra notes 27–64 and accompanying text.  
70
 C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
71
 Winter, supra note 2. 
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was named on the birth certificate.
72
 In C.O., the parties agreed that the sperm provider “was to be 
considered a ‘male role model’ for the child, and would be called ‘father.’”
73
 However, they 
disputed whether he was intended to have full parental rights.
74
 
The parties in Mintz v. Zoernig also wanted the sperm provider Zoernig to “serve as a 
male role model,” with the women as “primary parents.”
75
 The understanding was put in writing 
after the child’s birth, and the parties acted consistently with it. Mintz and her partner split up 
shortly after the birth of the child, and she subsequently conceived a second child with sperm 
from Zoernig with the same oral agreement regarding his limited role. Unlike most of the cases, in 
Mintz, the dispute arose because the mother sought child support from the sperm provider.
76
 
The court ruled in her favor, finding first that the UPA insemination provision did not 
apply because the mother inseminated herself, and second, that Zoernig qualified as a presumed 
father under the UPA by establishing a relationship with the children and holding them out as his 
own.
77
 The court further held that the contract purporting to limit his role was not enforceable 
because it relinquished only his parental responsibilities, not his parental rights, leaving open the 
possibility that a true sperm “donor” contract that relinquished all indicia of parental status might 
be enforceable.
78
 
An Oregon court reached the opposite result in a similar case, Leckie v. Voorhies, but 
this time the sperm provider was seeking paternity and visitation.
79
 As in Mintz, the parties signed 
a contract delineating that the “Donor,” Leckie, would have limited visitation rights at the 
convenience of the recipients, that he should not identify himself as father, only as sperm donor, 
and that he would be included in their lives as “a good male role model” but not as a father. 
Leckie visited the child for several hours a week over a period of years, made substantial financial 
contributions to her, and she referred to him as “Dad” without objection from Voorhies.
80
 Despite 
this substantial involvement in the child’s life and the reaffirmation of the contract after 
mediation, which spelled out further visitation, the court rejected his petition for paternity and 
visitation, ruling that Leckie had waived his parental rights through the agreement.
81
 Hence the 
court enforced the agreement as far as his relinquishment of parental status and his right to 
establish paternity, but declined to enforce the provision for visitation, even though the agreement 
stated that he could describe himself as “sperm donor with limited visitation rights.”
82
 Nor did the 
court think Leckie’s conduct after the birth of the child or reaffirmation of the contract sufficed to 
                                                                
72
 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532. 
73
 C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 524. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 862 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. at 863. 
78
 Id. at 864. 
79
 Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
80
 As did Voorhies’ other child. Id. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Leckie, 875 P.2d at 522 (emphasis added). 
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vitiate his waiver.
83
 
This result not only contrasts with Mintz; it seems to directly contradict the McIntyre 
case (discussed above) decided five years earlier by the same court and which held that 
application of the donor statute would be unconstitutional if the man donated in reliance on an 
agreement to parent.
84
 Leckie distinguished McIntyre because it was not relying on the 
insemination statute to deny the paternity petition, and McIntyre did not contain a written 
waiver.
85
 A more compelling distinction may be the anticipated role of the sperm provider. In 
McIntyre, the sperm provider alleged reliance on an “agreement” that he would “remain active” in 
the child’s life, have specific visitation and “participate in all important decisions.”
86
 While it 
seems splitting hairs to distinguish “remain active” from “visitation,” the involvement in “all 
major decisions” does more closely resemble full parental status, which Leckie had expressly 
waived. 
In Janssen v. Alicea, a mother conceived a child with sperm from a close friend.
87
 He 
claimed that they intended to co-parent. He was listed on the birth certificate and claimed he had 
played an active role during the pregnancy and the first two years of the child’s life. The mother 
claimed that he was merely a donor, that she and her partner intended to parent the child, and that 
any visitation that took place was at her discretion.
88
 The court reversed the grant of summary 
judgment for the mother, finding that it was possible to conclude that she and the sperm provider 
were a “commissioning couple” under Florida’s gamete donation statute, which would make him 
a legal father.
89
 
In a well-known New York case, Thomas S. v. Robin Y., the parties’ initial understanding 
of the sperm provider’s role appears to have been more limited than in other cases in this 
category. Here, the couple would be the child’s parents with no rights or responsibilities on the 
part of the sperm provider; however, Thomas, the sperm provider, would make himself available 
if the child wished to know her biological father.
90
 Thomas did develop a relationship with the 
child and ultimately sought parental status, which the court granted.
91
 This case is discussed in 
detail later in this article.
92
 
Two more cases involved lesbian couples anticipating some role for the sperm provider, 
but in these cases, the understanding also incorporated the sperm provider’s partner, though the 
partner’s rights did not become an issue in the case. In Tripp v. Hinckley, a lesbian couple 
recruited a friend to serve as sperm donor.
93
 They agreed that the couple would be parents while 
                                                                
83
 Id. at 522−23. 
84
 See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
85
 Leckie, 875 P.2d at 523 n. 3. 
86
 McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) 
87
 Janssen v. Alicea, 30 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
88
 Id. at 682. 
89
 Id. 
90
 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
91
 Id. at 362.  
92
 See infra notes 169-180 and accompanying text. 
93
 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
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the sperm provider and his gay partner would have regular contact with the child.
94
 After a second 
child was born, the parties signed a visitation agreement specifying regular visits throughout the 
year. The children called the sperm provider “Daddy,” and he regularly exercised his rights as 
their father. When the couple split up, he sought to increase visitation. The trial court granted his 
request, and the appellate court upheld it based on his well-developed relationship with the 
children. The agreement, though not binding, was enforceable if in the best interests of the 
children.
95
 
In Browne v. D’Alleva, D’Alleva conceived a child with sperm provided by a friend, 
Michael Browne.
96
 Both D’Alleva and Browne had partners.
97
 The mother alleged that all agreed 
that her partner would adopt the child and that Browne and his partner would have “some type of 
role as co-guardians” and “a role as secondary or ‘fun parents,’” while she and her partner would 
be “primary parents.”
98
 The sperm provider denied that he had agreed to be relegated to a “fun 
parent” and countered that he was supposed to be a legal guardian of the child.
99
 The parties did 
not reduce the agreement to writing, other than a standard sperm donor consent form supplied by 
the clinic where the insemination took place. After the child’s birth, the mother listed Browne as 
father on the birth certificate, and both signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity.
100
 Browne 
refused to consent to the child’s adoption by D’Alleva’s partner and sued for custody and 
visitation.
101
 The court found that the Connecticut insemination statute did not bar his suit because 
it did not reference known sperm donors and had been enacted to ensure legitimacy for married 
couples using artificial insemination. Even if it had, the court reasoned that such a statute would 
be unconstitutional if the sperm provider’s willingness to donate was premised on maintaining an 
ongoing relationship with the child.
102
 The court concluded that Browne had standing to bring the 
action based on both the parties’ preconception intent and the execution of the acknowledgment 
of paternity.
103
 
In one unusual case, Curtis v. Prince,
104
 the sperm provider apparently changed his mind 
several times about his role in the child’s life. Curtis donated sperm to a friend and her partner. He 
signed a written contract providing that he would not be a parent nor listed on the birth certificate, 
but he would be allowed to babysit occasionally. Shortly after the birth, Curtis initiated an 
administrative proceeding to establish paternity.
105
 The Agency ruled in his favor and ordered 
                                                                
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. at 507-08. 
96
 No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007). 
97
 Id. at *2. 
98
 Id. at *1.  
99
 Id.  
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. at *2. 
102
 Id. at *12. 
103
 Id. at *13. 
104
 Curtis v. Prince, No. 25194, 2010 WL 5071195 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
105
 Id. at *1. 
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child support. He appealed the child support order, but not the paternity determination. The court 
ruled that the mother had waived child support. Curtis subsequently moved to Florida. Five years 
later, the state child support enforcement agency sought a child support order on behalf of the 
mother. Curtis now argued that he was merely a sperm donor. Although the trial court agreed, the 
appellate court ruled that the prior proceeding was res judicata on the issue of paternity.
106
 The 
court also noted that the record contained no evidence of compliance with the Ohio insemination 
statute, presumably referring to the method of insemination, as Ohio requires supervision of a 
physician.
107
 
In an interesting twist, in two of the cases, the sperm provider was the brother of the 
mother’s partner.
108
 The choice of a family member to serve as sperm provider may reflect a 
desire to create a genetic link to the non-biological partner or simply the availability of an 
accessible and trusted option.
109
 In In re H.C.S., the sperm provider sued for paternity when the 
couple split up and he was denied visitation.
110
 The sperm provider alleged that he had donated in 
reliance on a verbal agreement that he would not act merely as a “donor,” but would be involved 
in the child’s life, and that he had visited with the child before being cut off by the biological 
mother when the couple’s relationship ended.
111
 The Texas appellate court held that he lacked 
standing to bring a paternity action because under the 2002 Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in 
Texas, a “donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.”
112
 The court 
disagreed with the Sullivan court’s conclusion that the question of donor status should be 
addressed in evaluating the paternity petition, not at the standing stage.
113
 
Likewise, in A.A.B. v. B.O.C., the sperm provider-uncle sought to establish paternity 
when the child was five, after the biological mother cut off her partner, the sperm provider’s 
sister, from visitation with the child.
114
 The sperm provider had not provided financial support for 
the child but had visited. The court applied the Florida insemination statute, which extinguished 
all donor rights and obligations.
115
 The court found further that the statute did not require that the 
insemination take place in a clinical setting to be applicable.
116
 
One wonders in these cases if the actions would have even been filed if the law 
recognized the partner’s parental rights. Possibly the lack of legal protection for the existing 
                                                                
106
 Id. at *2. 
107
 Id. at *3. 
108
 A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2006).  
109
 In a case that involved a dispute between lesbian co-parents, one of the sperm donors was the brother of 
the non-biological partner, who wanted to be biologically related to the child. The uncle/brother was not involved in the 
case. In re Madrone, No. 1201759CV, 2015 WL 2248221, at *2 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). 
110
 219 S.W.3d at 34.  
111
 Id.  
112
 Id. at 35 (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2015)) (The 2002 UPA). 
113
 Id.; see In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).  
114
 A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
115
 Id. at 763-64.  
116
 Id. at 764.  
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family unit motivated the uncle/sperm provider’s efforts to establish paternity. 
Not all the cases involving lesbian couples contemplated involvement by the donor. In 
Paternity of M.F. and C.F., a case from Indiana, a man agreed to provide semen to a friend and 
her life partner for the friend to conceive a child.
117
 The parties executed a contract relieving the 
donor of all parental rights and responsibilities. The insemination resulted in the birth of M.F. 
Seven years later, the mother had a second child, C.F., who was also the donor’s biological child. 
Although the adults obviously maintained some kind of contact, since the second child was 
conceived some years after the first, the facts do not indicate any contact between the sperm 
provider and either child. When the mother’s relationship with her partner ended, she sought 
public assistance. The County then filed an action on her behalf against the sperm provider to 
establish paternity and support.
118
 
Although Indiana does not have an artificial insemination statute, the court looked to the 
UPA for guidance and held that the contract relieving the donor of parental rights and 
responsibilities was valid if the semen had been provided to a physician, and if the parties had 
executed a sufficiently thorough and formalized written contract.
119
 In this case, the lengthy and 
sophisticated contract, which had been drafted by an attorney, was sufficient to be enforceable.
120
 
The parties disputed the manner of insemination, but the court placed the burden on the party 
seeking to avoid the contract—the mother—to prove that insemination occurred by intercourse 
and without a physician. She failed to meet that burden, so the court found the contract was 
enforceable.
121
 
However, the parties entered into the contract shortly before the birth of the first child 
and the document only referenced that child. The parties did not execute another agreement before 
the second child’s birth. Without a contract governing the second child, the court classified the 
sperm provider as a father to that child and liable for child support.
122
 Hence he was a donor to 
one child and a father to the other. 
In the final category of cases, the court in some fashion recognized parental-type rights 
for both the lesbian co-parents and the sperm provider.
123
 The details of these cases are discussed 
later in Part III.D.3. 
                                                                
117
 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
118
 Id. at 1257-58. 
119
 Id. at 1261; Cf. In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040 (Kan. 2007) (rejecting sperm provider’s claim to 
parental rights based on lack of written agreement, as required by statute).  
120
 M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1261−62. 
121
 Id. at 1260. 
122
 See id. at 1263. 
123
 LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In one additional case, a court enforced an indemnification provision in a donor contract in which 
the donor agreed to forgo seeking a legal relationship with the child, who had been adopted by the mother’s lesbian 
partner, but settlement of various proceedings resulted in visitation rights for the donor. In re B.N.L.-B., 375 S.W.3d 557 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2012). 
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C. Insights From The Cases 
This case survey yields several useful insights for reconsidering the legal regime 
governing use of sperm provided by men known to the mother. First, most of the women did not 
use a physician to perform the insemination, with the lesbian couples seemingly choosing in-
home insemination more often. Only one of the fifteen lesbian couples definitively used a 
physician to perform the insemination,
124
 though in two cases, the involvement of a physician was 
disputed and in a few others, the facts were silent as to whether the insemination took place under 
medical supervision.
125
 By contrast, a physician was involved in nearly fifty percent of the cases 
involving single women or unmarried heterosexual couples.
126
 In the cases that did involve a 
physician, only one applied the statute strictly and held that the sperm provider was a donor, 
regardless of the parties’ intent, without any opportunity to try to establish facts showing he was 
entitled to parentage based on intention, agreement, or conduct.
127
 Several courts did hold, 
however, that failure to comply with the statute required the sperm provider to be considered a 
parent or rendered the statute inapplicable, forcing the court to consider other rationales for 
assigning status to the sperm provider.
128
 
Second, roughly the same proportion of lesbian couple cases and single/opposite-sex 
couple cases involved written agreements—about a third, yet courts differed on the enforceability 
of written agreements that attempted to define the sperm provider’s status. The two courts 
considering co-parenting agreements honored them,
129
 but the decisions were nearly evenly split 
when it came to agreements attempting to limit the donor’s rights and responsibilities.
130
 By 
contrast, in every case where the parties executed another type of legal document supporting a 
father’s claim of paternity, such as a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity and naming the 
                                                                
124
 Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
125
 C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994) (method disputed); M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1260 
(same); see In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005); In re B.N.L.-B, 375 S.W.3d 557, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2012); Jacob, 923 A.2d at 475−76; LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 157 (no facts regarding method). Thus 65% were reported 
as in-home inseminations. 
126
 Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1240 (Pa. 2007); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 715 (Va. 
2013); Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
789, 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007); In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 28 (Colo. 
1989); In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840, 842 (Wash. 2005). 
127
 Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 487, discussed infra at notes 254–55 and accompanying text. 
128
 Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 776−77 (Va. Ct. App. 2015); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 
1177 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537−38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); C.O. v. 
W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Misc. 1994); B.W.P. v. A.L.H., 155 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
129
 In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. App. 2005); L.F., 736 S.E.2d at 722. 
130
 Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861, 864 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522−23 
(Or. Ct. App. 1994); M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1262; B.N.L.-B, 375 S.W.3d at 563; Steve Fry, Attorney: Marotta Not The 
Father In The ‘Unusual’ Circumstances Of Sperm Donor Case, TOPEKA CAP-J. (Jan. 4, 2015, 4:40PM), 
http://cjonline.com/news/2015-01-04/attorney-marotta-not-father-unusual-circumstances-sperm-donor-case; E.E. v. 
O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1173 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) (holding that the parental rights of one parent may not be 
terminated by consent except when it is accompanied by the adoption of the child by another party, contract was not 
honored); Brown v. Gadson, 654 S.E.2d 179, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (honoring contract relieving donor of duties); 
Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (honoring contract limiting donor’s rights).  
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provider as father on the birth certificate, the court ruled in the sperm provider’s favor, even if the 
court did not always rely solely on the documents.
131
 The preference for VAPs, rather than 
contracts, as a basis for assigning legal parentage may suggest courts’ comfort with more 
traditional markers of parental status, and their reluctance to open the door to the potentially more 
expansive and still novel option of defining parental rights based on contract. 
In terms of outcome, looking at the run of cases, the courts ruled approximately two-to-
one in favor of establishing paternity. It is important to keep in mind, though, that in a number of 
these cases, the posture of the case raised only threshold questions, such as whether the sperm 
provider had standing to seek paternity, or revived suits that had been adjudicated by motions to 
dismiss or summary judgment, giving the party the opportunity to prove that he qualified as a 
father. These decisions do not mean that the party necessarily succeeded in establishing paternity 
or obtaining custody or visitation rights. Nonetheless, the lopsided results reveal the particular 
vulnerability of single women and lesbian couples who choose this method of family building. 
The causes of the skew could be, and doubtlessly are, many and varied. As we have seen, 
the statutory parameters vary significantly among jurisdictions. Men’s constitutional right to 
parent was critical for some courts. Beyond that concern, the disproportionate findings in favor of 
attempts to establish paternity might reflect either structural bias—the statutory underpinnings 
and default rules favor a legal father for every child—or at least a two-parent family, as well as 
the binary approach existing laws take to this issue—that is, sperm providers must be either 
donors with no rights or fathers with full rights. While some courts did ignore the sperm 
provider’s involvement with the children and declare them donors, others—perhaps not 
surprisingly—leaned toward parental status. Preference for paternity may also reflect bias on the 
part of the judicial decision-makers, though most of the cases avoid any statements openly 
evincing bias. Whatever the cause of the disparate results, we can be certain that the current 
system invites litigation and fails to accurately capture the parties’ intentions and lives. What 
values, then, should guide us in crafting legal rules that will work better for those choosing to use 
directed donation to create their families? 
II. VALUES AND ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR GAMETE DONATION LAWS 
Family law in the United States is notoriously inconsistent from one jurisdiction to 
another and sometimes within a particular state, particularly when it comes to assisted 
reproduction and non-traditional family forms. Yet the system as a whole rests on a shared 
foundational purpose: to serve the best interests of children. Legislators, scholars, judges and 
members of the public often strenuously disagree about how to achieve that goal, but there is little 
dissent that child welfare lies at the heart of our family law system—or at least that it should.
132
 
Thus our first value should be maximizing children’s well-being, recognizing, as scholar 
Katharine Baker has noted, “that it is incredibly difficult to ascertain children’s interests in the 
abstract.
133
 
                                                                
131
 Janssen v. Alicea, 30 So. 3d 680, 681 (Fla. Dist .Ct. App. 2010); Tripp v. Hinckley, 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 
508 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); 
Cf. Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that voluntary acknowledgements of paternity by sperm 
donors are invalid under CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(f)(3) (West 2015)).  
132
 See Garrison, supra note 24, at 844 (“family law has consistently preferred the interests of children and 
the public to those of parents and parent claimants.”). 
133
 Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 682 
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The best interest of the child principle, though, does not reign exclusively. Another 
principle also percolates throughout family law—the concept of parental rights. This principle has 
found its most powerful expression in our constitutional jurisprudence, which recognizes that 
parents have a fundamental right to control the care, custody, and upbringing of their children.
134
 
The notion of parental rights, for my purposes, subsumes three aspects—autonomy, privacy and 
fairness. The adults involved in assisted reproduction have intentionally created these families, 
and the role they play in their children’s lives will surely be among their most meaningful 
experiences. Parenthood has been described as “central to human flourishing” and a “deeply 
expressive activity” that enables people to fulfill and share their deepest values about life and 
achieve “transcendent” selflessness.
135
 These parents deserve a system that will maximize their 
freedom, protect their privacy from unwarranted state intrusion,
136
 and treat them consistently, 
without discrimination or arbitrariness. 
It is important to note that the parental rights principle to some extent reflects the larger 
goal of protecting child well-being, for part of the rationale for recognizing parental rights as 
fundamental is the presumption that “parents” will act in the best interests of their children.
137
 
Clearly that is not always the case, and family law is replete with instances where the court has to 
balance the parents’ rights with the child’s interests, often with the understanding that the child’s 
interests take precedence.
138
 The law governing gamete donation may at times present one of 
those instances. 
The third value—pluralism—has the potential to further both of the previous values—
child well-being and parental rights. The traditional nuclear family—a married, heterosexual 
couple raising their naturally conceived, biologically related children—no longer dominates the 
family structure landscape. Today, a significant percentage of children are being raised in single 
parent homes (usually by single mothers) and by unmarried couples.
139
 The movement toward full 
                                                                
(2008). 
134
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534−35 (1925).  
135
 Baker, supra note 133, at 679.  
136
 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that [our] decisions have respected the private realm of 
family life which the state cannot enter”). 
137
 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; Garrison, supra note 24, at 864 (“Today, parents’ rights are thought to derive 
from—and to be limited by—their children’s interests. Family law has thus moved consistently in the direction of a child-
centered view of parental entitlements”). 
138
 Garrison, supra note 24, at 893−94; Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: 
Revisiting the Channeling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133, 2175 (2007). 
139
 Harvey L. Fiser & Paul K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard, Legal Definitions of 
“Best Interest of the Child” and the Right to Contract for Lesbian Potential Parents, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1, 
30−31 (2008); Deborah Zalesne, The Contractual Family: The Role of the Market in Shaping Family Formations and 
Rights, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1027, 1080 (2015) (“Twenty-eight million children in the United States are raised in families 
in which their caregivers are not exclusively two heterosexual parents who are biologically related to their children . . . .”); 
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 28 (2014) (stating the 
traditional family accounts for only 20% of U.S. households). 
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equality for gays and lesbians, coupled with the proliferation of assisted reproduction options, has 
enabled same-sex couples to build families that are increasingly achieving legal recognition and 
protection. The growing prevalence of infertility has also led to families created through gamete 
donation and other forms of collaborative reproduction. As scholars J. Herbie DiFonzo and Ruth 
C. Stern astutely observe, “[f]or the continued viability of a legal system, demographics are 
destiny. The family law universe no longer spins on the axis of married heterosexual couples and 
their children.”
140
 
Given this demographic and social change, a core principle for devising a legal regime 
governing allocation of rights and responsibilities for those using gametes from others must be 
pluralism: our laws should recognize and protect these various family configurations and allow 
them to thrive. This approach will serve the interests of children and the adults who are raising 
them, as well as those of the gamete providers who act as donors, and those who take a more 
active, but non-parental role in the child’s life.
141
 They, too, share an interest in fairness and 
autonomy. 
The fourth value I will call coherence. To the extent possible, the overall scheme of laws 
governing families should exhibit a reasonable level of consistency. Some would refer to this as 
the “equality” value: that the laws treat those creating families by assisted reproduction equally—
or the same as—those creating families through sex. The equality argument has its greatest force 
when fighting discrimination in access to reproductive treatment.
142
 However, I prefer the term 
coherence because in determining parentage and relationship rights, pertinent differences among 
these families do exist, thus “equal” or identical treatment may not be in order. Coherence does 
align in some respects with legal scholar Marsha Garrison’s “interpretive” mode of analysis, 
which “requires consistency with current law, public policy, and public values.” 
143
 However, 
Garrison elevates consistency to the preeminent value, regardless of the wisdom of existing law 
and policies.
144
 By contrast, my concern with coherence calls for awareness that if we do treat 
families created through assisted reproduction differently, we should have good reasons. And by 
“good reasons,” I mean those consonant with the other values I identify here, which in the case of 
pluralism in particular, may move well beyond the approach of existing law. 
The final value—functionality—reflects process concerns and incorporates aspects of 
two of the functions of family law identified by Carl Schneider: the facilitative and the arbitral.
145
 
Whatever regime we devise should operate effectively for the parties involved. Ideally, 
individuals choosing to conceive with gametes from someone known to them should know what 
legal effects flow from that choice. They should also be able to access the means necessary to 
                                                                
140
 J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Breaking the Mold and Picking up the Pieces: Rights of 
Parenthood and Parentage in Nontraditional Families, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 104, 106 (2013) [hereinafter “Breaking”]. 
141
 Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 541 
(2004) (“a pluralistic approach . . . is based on a commitment to inclusion and respect for difference, grounded in our 
political and constitutional values of equality, nondiscrimination, and religious freedom.”).  
142
 See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process: Developing an 
Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 455, 465 (1999).  
143
 Garrison, supra note 24, at 878. 
144
 Id. (“A consistent result will not necessarily be an ideal result, or one that we would choose if we were 
beginning life in a brave new world without precedents or past practices.”) 
145
 Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992).  
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effectuate their intentions and protect their families, and they should enjoy a comfortable level of 
certainty about their legal rights and responsibilities. 
With these five values as guiding principles, the next sections will detail specific core 
precepts necessary to creating a system consistent with these values. 
A. The Law Should Embrace Non-Traditional Parents 
1. The law should not discriminate against unmarried opposite-sex couples or co-parents 
Under the current system, some jurisdictions have statutes that on their face discriminate 
against unmarried couples that use artificial insemination or IVF to conceive. For example, 
section 5 of the 1973 UPA, adopted in a significant number of states, provides that a donor who 
provides sperm to a licensed physician for someone other than his wife is not a parent.
146
 Texas 
has an even broader statute, excluding male donors from classification as alleged father and 
defining donor as “an individual who produces . . . sperm used for assisted reproduction.”
147
 
A statute that treats all providers of sperm for someone other than a spouse as a donor 
without any parental rights essentially denies unmarried couples or opposite-sex co-parents the 
option of using assisted reproduction to conceive.
148
 As indicated above, large numbers of couples 
now cohabit outside of marriage; many of them are raising children. Although no specific data 
exists quantifying how many unmarried couples seek fertility treatment, we can assume that the 
rate of infertility does not dramatically differ among couples that have chosen to eschew 
marriage.
149
 At the same time, social media and the Internet have spawned a new form of 
intentional co-parenting by men and women who have no prior relationship of any kind and thus 
may prefer to procreate non-coitally.
150
 Research has documented barriers that have deterred 
                                                                
146
 Unif. Parentage Act of 1973, CAL. FAM. CODE § 5 (West 2015); See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 
(2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2015); DEL. CODE 
ANN. § 8-702 (West 2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.14 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405(1) (West 2015); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 210-824(2) (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(2) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 
2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-702 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95(B) (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 109.239 (West 2015); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-702 (West 
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101(7) (West 2015); WISC. STAT. 
ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-902 (West 2015). 
147
 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.0015(b), 160.102(6) (West 2015); But see In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 
911 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the statute was ambiguous and potential donor had standing to seek paternity where 
sperm provider and recipient signed co-parenting agreement prior to insemination). Compare In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (sperm provider to lesbian couple held to have no standing to seek paternity where he alleged an oral 
agreement to be involved in child’s life). 
148
 On its face, treating all men who provide sperm for artificial insemination as donors also discriminates 
against unmarried men, but unmarried men wishing to parent exclusively must use surrogacy, which raises other issues 
beyond the scope of this article. 
149
 Infertility, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Feb. 6, 2015), 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/infertility.htm; Reproductive Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Apr. 16, 
2015), www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility.index.htm.  
150
 See How to Find a Co-Parent, CO-PARENT MATCH, http://www.co-parentmatch.com/co-
parenting.aspx#8 (last visited June 22, 2015) (providing a place for those seeking co-parents, whether opposite or same-
sex, to post profiles and connect with potential co-parent matches); Jennifer Griswold, People Turn to Internet to Find Co-
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unmarried couples and others from accessing treatment. Fortunately, physicians have begun to 
recognize that discrimination based on marital status is unethical and potentially illegal,
151
 which 
may lead to greater use of artificial insemination by unmarried couples. 
As we saw, several of the cases have held that statutes that operate as a complete bar to 
establishing parentage for a man who provides sperm for assisted reproduction, could violate his 
constitutional right to parent if he donated intending to parent.
152
 In McIntyre v. Crouch, the court 
held that Oregon’s insemination statute, which would operate as a complete bar for men who 
provide sperm for use by a non-spouse, would be unconstitutional if the petitioner could prove 
that he provided sperm to a friend on the understanding he would act as a parent.
153
 The court 
reasoned that, under Lehr v. Robertson, a potential father must have the right to “grasp the 
opportunity” to act as a father, even in this context: “[t]he Due Process Clause can afford no 
different protection to petitioner as the biological father because the child was conceived by 
artificial insemination rather than by sexual intercourse.”
154
 
The Breit case presented an even stronger claim to parentage. Recall that in Breit, the 
parties signed a co-parenting agreement prior to conception, as well as a voluntary 
acknowledgment of paternity after the child was born. The father lived with the mother and child 
for four months and acted in every way as a father. The Virginia Supreme Court acknowledged 
that the insemination statute was enacted with married women in mind, and that its “primary 
purpose” was “to protect cohesive family units from claims of third-party intruders who served as 
mere donors.”
155
 In this situation, Breit was no intruder; he and the mother “represented the 
closest thing [the child] had to a ‘family unit.’”
156
 Under these circumstances, applying the statute 
would be unconstitutional. 
 
                                                                
Parents, KMTV NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.scrippsmedia.com/kmtv/news/People-Turn-to-Internet-to-Find-Co-
Parents—247421991.html (relating story of co-parents brought together by Facebook). 
151
 Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 44 (2008); Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons: 
A Committee Opinion, AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED. 1524, 1525 (Oct. 2, 2013), 
https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Reports_and_Statement
s/fertility_gaylesunmarried.pdf; N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Super. Ct., 44 Cal. 4th 
1145, 1158 (Cal. 2008). 
152
 See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1041 (Kan. 2007) (agreeing in dicta that absolute-bar statutes could 
violate sperm provider’s constitutional rights); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); C.O. v. W.S., 
639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Misc. 1994). 
153
 McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 244; See also C.O., 639 N.E.2d at 525 (assuming insemination statute does apply, 
application would be unconstitutional if donor and woman agreed to relationship between donor and child). 
154
 McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 245. One judge disagreed, finding that the state had a “compelling interest” in 
regulating artificial insemination” and that “[t]he statutes contemplate that the ultimate relationship, or absence of one, 
must be defined before the child is conceived in order to facilitate informed decisions about whether to donate and to 
conceive. The statutory policy assures the stability of all the parties’ lives in the aftermath of the decisions. The holding of 
the lead opinion turns the statutory scheme into a house of sand.”; Id. at 247−48 (Richardson, P.J., dissenting).  
155
 L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 720 (Va. 2013). 
156
 Id. 
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2. The law should respect the integrity of single parents and same sex parents 
If one of our guiding values is pluralism, any approach to sperm donation must respect 
and protect not just unmarried opposite sex couples or men and women who choose to parent 
together, but single parent families and those headed by same-sex parents.
157
 As we have seen, 
many of the appellate cases have involved disputes between a sperm provider and a woman who 
planned to raise the child with her lesbian partner, and several of the other cases involved claims 
by women who intended to parent alone. From a practical standpoint, the best way to protect these 
families under the current system is clearly to avoid use of known donors altogether. Anonymous 
sperm donation ensures that a single mother will be able to parent without any involvement or 
interference by the donor. While the law is in flux regarding the rights of lesbian co-parents in 
that context too, at least the biological mother will not have to risk claims by the donor. 
However, for a variety of reasons, some women prefer to know the identity of the donor. 
Some choose a known donor out of concern for the future medical and emotional needs of the 
child. As they mature, some donor offspring may have questions about their family medical 
history—in some cases urgent; others are curious about their paternal origins or have a 
psychological need to fill in that missing piece of their identity.
158
 Increasingly, commentators and 
activists have expressed trepidation about donor siblings and the possibility of accidental incest. 
All of these concerns have led several other countries to ban anonymous donation
159
 and for some 
to call for the same here,
160
 which may influence some women’s decisions. Some women may 
desire more than the potential for information about or future contact with the donor. They may 
intentionally recruit a known donor who will actually play a role in the child’s life.
161
 Other 
women may prefer known donors because they are free. A vial of anonymous sperm from a sperm 
bank can cost several hundred dollars, an amount that could increase rapidly with multiple 
attempts.
162
 Still others may simply feel more comfortable conceiving a child with someone they 
know, rather than with a complete stranger.
163
 
                                                                
157
 I obviously part company with Garrison on this point as she argues strongly for an approach that would 
deny single women the right to reliably create a single-parent family. Garrison, supra note 24, at 903−09; See also Susan 
Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 376 (2012) (discussing 
inconsistency of using “children’s equality” as argument for same sex marriage while arguing against mandatory 
recognition of sperm donors as fathers). 
158
 Cahn, supra note 24, at 109−11; Fiser, supra note 139, at 6; Polikoff, supra note 7, at 62; Melanie 
Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 337 (2007). 
159
 See Cahn, supra note 24, at 168 (mentioning Switzerland, the UK and Sweden). 
160
 Id. at 144 (advocating mandatory disclosure of donor identity when offspring reach 18 years of age). 
161
 See Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . . and a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 19 (1996) (discussing attitudes among lesbian women). 
162
 See, e.g., List of Available Services & Fees, SPERM BANK, INC., 
http://www.spermbankcalifornia.com/sperm-bank-cost.html (last visited June 22, 2015) (providing a standard list of 
prices). 
163
 See Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007) (noting failure to allow for directed sperm 
donation would force mother to conceive using anonymous sperm or give up biological motherhood completely, ignoring 
her “personal preference to conceive using the sperm of someone familiar, whose background, traits, and medical history 
are not shrouded in mystery.”). 
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Whatever the motivation, we can be sure that the use of known donors will not 
disappear. If anything, the practice may increase. There is no way to know how many women use 
known donors for which of these various reasons, but ideally the law should accommodate these 
variations. For those who choose known donors for cost or to keep open the possibility of contact 
when the child has reached adulthood, or in the event a medical need arises, the statutory scheme 
should allow for true donors who have no rights or responsibilities of any kind with respect to the 
children conceived with their gametes. This rule would essentially treat known donors the same 
way the law treats anonymous donors.
164
 Both versions of the UPA and other state statutes have 
language that accomplishes this goal.
165
 However, complications arise when this simple 
proposition occupies the entire field of options for use of known sperm providers, when even 
those who initially desire a true donor arrangement act inconsistently with that intent, when one 
party has a change of heart about the arrangement, or when the parties use in-home insemination. 
How to handle each of these situations will be addressed in the sections that follow. 
B. The Law Should Move Beyond The Binary Parent-Stranger Paradigm To Accommodate The 
Diversity Of Family Arrangements Created Through Sperm Donation 
As we have seen, in a number of cases, the parties explicitly contemplated that the sperm 
provider would play a role in the child’s life. The agreements variously described him as a “role 
model” or a “secondary or fun parent,” promised him a “significant relationship with the child” or 
provided that he would have an opportunity to visit the child.
166
 When disputes arose, the mother 
asserted that the intent was always that she (and perhaps her partner, in the lesbian couple cases) 
would occupy the role of legal parent, with any involvement on the part of the sperm provider 
dependent on parental discretion, as it generally would be for any other third party. Sometimes 
this was clear from the written agreement, sometimes not, and a number of the cases turned on 
supposed oral understandings. 
Several problems emerge in these situations. First, in the absence of a written agreement, 
these disputes inevitably become he-said, she-said contests about the intent of the parties. As the 
donor often has had contact with the child, the conduct only serves to further muddy the waters. 
Second, in at least some of the cases, whether by written agreement or oral understanding, all 
parties expected the donor to be a part of the child’s life in some fashion, and the donor relied on 
this promise in choosing to donate. Yet the law presently has no mechanism for accommodating 
the donor’s involvement in the child’s life, short of assigning parental status. Rather, courts are 
compelled to assign the sperm provider to the “parent” box or the “stranger” box, regardless of his 
actual role in the family. Unfortunately, this binary approach disserves the needs of both the 
                                                                
164
 See id. (upholding a contract between mother and donor extinguishing donor’s rights where “negotiated, 
clinical arrangement . . . closely mimics the trappings of anonymous sperm donation . . . .”). 
165
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2015) (The statutory language stating that “The donor of semen 
provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted reproduction of a woman other 
than the donor’s spouse is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise 
agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the conception of the child” treats known donors and 
anonymous donors the same.). 
166
 See also W.R.L. v. A.H., No. 2014-CA-001240-ME, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 668, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. 
Apr. 17, 2015) (sperm provider not involved in dispute between former same sex partners, but case mentions purported 
donor contract stating that donor “would like to see the child and be a part of its life, but only as a family friend or an 
uncle or something in that nature”). 
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children and adults involved. How can the law better respond to these issues? 
1. “Role Models” do not equal “Fathers” 
The “father” versus “interloper” narrative emerges strongly in one of the classic cases in 
this area. In Thomas S. v. Robin Y.,
167
 Thomas agreed to provide his sperm so Robin could 
conceive a child to be raised with her partner Sandra. A daughter, Ry, was born. The parties orally 
agreed that Thomas would not call, provide support or give gifts to Ry until requested. When Ry 
was three, her older sister Cade began inquiring about her biological father. Robin and Sandra 
agreed the girls should meet their biological fathers. Thomas accepted the invitation, and a 
relationship developed. Although the parties disputed the details, Thomas visited Ry twenty-six 
times, totaling anywhere from sixty to 148 days over a period of six years. He developed a “warm 
and amicable relationship” with her, as evidenced by “numerous” cards and letters in which Ry 
expressed her love for him.
168
 The relationship between Thomas and Robin and Sandra broke 
down when he asked to take Ry and her sister on a trip to visit his family, without the mothers 
present.
169
  The New York court ultimately held that Thomas was Ry’s father, granting his request 
for an order of filiation.
170
 
The mothers argued that recognizing Thomas as Ry’s legal father would disrupt their 
family unit. They presented psychiatric evidence that Ry feared the disruption and wished to 
cease all contact with Thomas. The majority attributed Ry’s apparent change of heart toward 
Thomas to “manipulation” by her mothers and “poisoning” of Ry’s “formerly amicable” 
relationship with Thomas.
171
 In the court’s view, “[t]he asserted sanctity of the family unit is an 
uncompelling ground for the drastic step of depriving petitioner of procedural due process.”
172
 
Of course, one cannot help but notice that courts are much more solicitous of protecting 
the “family” when it adheres to the traditional heteronormative structure.
173
 It is hard to read the 
majority’s opinion as anything but disparaging of the family created by Robin, Sandra and their 
two daughters. Indeed, the dissent painted a sharply contrasting picture, characterizing Thomas’s 
relationship with Ry as “that of a close family friend or fond surrogate uncle who, while 
acknowledging that he was her biological sperm donor, fully recognized that her family unit 
consisted of her two mothers and her sister Cade and that he was not a family member of that 
unit.”
174
 The dissent went on to expand on the effect the proceedings had had on Ry: 
[She] views the proceedings as a threat to her sense of family security. She is angry at 
petitioner and feels betrayed by him because she and her family had counted on him as a 
                                                                
167
 Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
168
 Id. at 358. 
169
 Id.  
170
 Id. at 362. 
171
 Id. at 359−60. 
172
 Id. at 359. 
173
 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119−20 (1989) (upholding conclusive presumption of 
paternity in favor of husband of over biological father against constitutional challenge). 
174
 Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 363 (Ellerin, J., dissenting).  
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supporter of their unconventional family unit. The thought of visiting appellant, and her 
deep-seated fear that he might seek custody of her, have caused Ry anxiety and 
nightmares . . . .
175
 
The dissent also noted that the court-ordered psychiatrist had found that Ry’s fears did 
not flow from “brainwashing” by her mothers.
176
 
Families like Ry’s, as well as those headed by single mothers, deserve respect and 
treatment equal to that afforded opposite-sex, married couples. A sperm provider who plays a 
limited role in the child’s life and inhabits a role other than parent should not have the opportunity 
to claim parental status. However, perhaps the law needs to change to accommodate some kind of 
recognition of the active sperm donor.
177
 In his thoughtful analysis of the Thomas S. case, Carlos 
Ball notes that “part of the difficulty that Tom Steel faced when litigating his case was that he 
essentially had to choose between contending that he was a full legal parent, with all the 
accompanying rights and obligations, and conceding that he was a legal stranger to his biological 
daughter.”
178
 Expanding the legal options beyond “stranger” and “parent” may better reflect the 
agreement among the participants as well as the way these families actually operate and further 
the interests of children who have developed a relationship with their biological fathers. Doing so 
might also create a space for gay men who wish to have children and be considered a bona fide 
part of the child’s family, albeit not a parent. As other scholars have observed, gay men face 
numerous obstacles to becoming full-fledged parents.
179
 Gay men were identified as the sperm 
provider in many of the cases involving lesbian couples.
180
 Recognition of a special status might 
fulfill their need for familial ties while serving the child’s interests. Recognition of the active 
sperm provider might also actually deter litigation by presenting less of a threat to the integrity of 
                                                                
175
 Id. at 364. 
176
 Id. at 367. 
177
 See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 82 (arguing for recognition of agreement to allow contact between sperm 
donor and child); Bernstein, supra note 161, at 5 (arguing that a law does not require a “reductionist binary thinking” that 
limits parentage to either “two functional parents” or “two biological parents”); Kelly, supra note 19, at 214−15 
(identifying model combining presumption of parenthood for lesbian partners with assignment of non-parental legal 
recognition of sperm donor as particularly desirable among lesbian couples surveyed: “For mothers whose families 
actually resembled the combination model—a conjugal couple with an involved known donor—it was particularly 
attractive. They could see their own families reflected in the model and realized how it would have benefited them if it had 
been in place when their children were born.”); Cf. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and 
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 446−48 (2013) 
(discussing calls for “levels of parenthood rights” based on, inter alia, caregiving). 
178
 CARLOS BALL, THE RIGHT TO BE PARENTS: LGBT FAMILIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
PARENTHOOD 132 (2012).  
179
 See Elizabeth J. Levy, Virgin Fathers: Paternity Law, Assisted Reproductive Technology, and the Legal 
Bias Against Gay Dads, 22 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 893, 894-895 (2014) (arguing that presuming that sperm 
providers are donors discriminates against gay men desiring to be fathers); Bernstein, supra note 161, at 12−17 (reviewing 
the history of gay parenting and noting multiple obstacles). 
180
 See Bernstein, supra note 161, at 23. See, e.g, C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Misc. 1994); 
Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Tripp v. Hinckley, 736 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002); Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007 WL 4636692 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 
N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Curtis v. Prince, No. 25194, 2010 WL 5071195 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010). 
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the family, thus perhaps encouraging resolution of the dispute outside of court. Whether, and how, 
the law can accomplish that task is considered in the next section.
181
 
2. The law should provide limited legal recognition to active sperm providers 
In order to create a special non-parent status for active sperm providers, we need to 
resolve a number of questions. First, what kind of rights or responsibilities would flow from such 
a special status? As we are positing something less than full parental status, the sperm provider 
would not have the option of pursuing custody of any kind—whether physical or legal.
182
 Nor 
would the sperm provider be subject to claims for child support.
183
 Parental rights and 
responsibilities would remain vested entirely in the legal parent(s). The active sperm provider 
would have only a right to visitation with the child if visitation were in the best interests of the 
child. 
The ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution incorporate this notion. The 
Principles provide that a biological parent who is not a legal parent, such as a gamete donor, who 
has reserved some parental rights or responsibilities by agreement with the parent(s) can bring an 
action to enforce those rights.
184
 Indeed, a model for this kind of visitation right already exists. 
Most states now allow post-adoption visitation where birth mothers have conditioned their 
consent to adoption on continued contact with the child after the adoption is finalized.
185
 These 
agreements typically must be in writing and approved by the court as part of the adoption. 
Enforcement depends on whether visitation serves the child’s best interests. 
The analogy admittedly is not exact: sperm donation typically does not trigger any kind 
of judicial oversight. Nor am I suggesting that the law mandate judicial involvement at the time 
the donor agreement is made. Requiring a court proceeding would add substantially to the 
financial burden on the parties. In adoption, the requirement of court approval for post-adoption 
contact adds nothing to the parties’ burden because adoption already requires court approval. 
Imposing a similar requirement on those using donated gametes could cause delay in the 
procedure and would lead to state interference in a private decision between the donor and the 
recipient. As the state has no say over whether and with whom individuals choose to procreate 
sexually, it should have no say over whether and with whom individuals choose to procreate using 
donated gametes. Moreover, gamete donation does not prompt the same concerns as adoption 
regarding the vulnerability and potential for exploitation of the birth mother and adoptive parents 
                                                                
181
 See infra note 182–222 and accompanying text. 
182
 See James B. Boskey, The Swamps of Home: A Reconstruction of the Parent-Child Relationship, 26 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 805, 816 (1995) (arguing that parental rights be “unbundled” to allow quasi-parents who enjoyed a 
substantial relationship with a child but have not assumed all parental rights and duties to claim a right of association). 
183
 However, a sperm provider who agreed to provide financial support as part of a valid contract with the 
intended parents could be liable for breach of contract. He would not be subject to claims by the state or jurisdiction of the 
family court. 
184
 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION 
§§ 2.04, 2.08, illus. 32 & 33, 2.18(2)(b), illus. 6 (2002) (allowing allocation of parental responsibility by court to 
biological parent who is not legal parent but has agreement with legal parent retaining some parental rights or 
responsibilities). 
185
 Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
309, 319 (2012) (26 states and the District of Columbia as of 2011). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss1/3
FORMAN_FORMAT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2016  9:28 AM 
2016] EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILIES CREATED WITH KNOWN SPERM PROVIDERS 69 
that makes judicial oversight of adoption essential.
186
 
While allowing enforcement of such agreements might seem to undermine the parents’ 
rights, doing so might provide some security by depriving the sperm provider of the ability to 
seek custody. The parents might feel freer to allow the relationship to develop without fear of 
such a claim.
187
 
A thornier issue is whether recognition of limited rights for the active sperm provider 
must rest on an express prior agreement among the participants, or whether conduct can suffice. 
On the one hand, from both the child’s perspective and the sperm provider’s perspective, once a 
relationship develops, harm may result if the relationship is severed, regardless of whether the 
parties expressly agreed prior to conception that the sperm provider would play an active role in 
the child’s life. On the other hand, allowing subsequent conduct to trigger a right to petition the 
court for visitation over the parents’ objections may open the door wider than it should. Although 
we might hope that a “middle-ground” option for active sperm providers would ease conflict, a 
standard that is too loose may well prompt more litigation, as sperm providers with little contact 
seek to expand their access to the child, in violation of the prior agreement or understanding with 
the parent(s).
188
 Moreover, the sperm provider’s claim to visitation, from a fairness standpoint, 
carries significantly more weight if the donation was premised on the opportunity to play a role in 
the child’s life. 
The parties’ mutual intent may also bolster the sperm provider’s rights as a matter of 
constitutional law. The biggest legal hurdle to adopting a right to visit by active sperm providers 
premised solely on conduct is undoubtedly Troxel v. Granville.
189
 In Troxel, the Supreme Court 
considered a challenge to a Washington third-party visitation statute that allowed “‘[a]ny person’” 
to petition for visitation “‘at any time,’” and authorized the court to grant the petition “whenever 
‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”
190
 A fractured court struck down the statute 
as applied to grandparents seeking to visit their grandchildren after the death of their son, the 
children’s father. The mother had allowed them to visit, but not as much as they liked. Describing 
the statute as “breathtakingly broad,” the plurality opinion held that the statute impermissibly 
infringed on the parent’s fundamental right to rear her children.
191
 To pass constitutional muster, 
the statute must at a minimum give “special weight” to the parent’s determination of whether 
visitation would be in the child’s best interests, though the Court declined to define what “special 
weight” entails.
192
 The plurality also suggested that a court could adjust the amount of weight 
                                                                
186
 Cf. Sarah Abramowicz, Contractualizing Custody, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 67, 122−23 (2014) (discussing 
concerns over duress in creation of custody or visitation agreements). 
187
 See John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/19/magazine/19fathering.html. (describing mothers’ paranoia about allowing visitation); 
Bernstein, supra note 161, at 22 (describing their “anxiety”).  
188
 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 214 (describing importance of consent requirement among lesbian couples 
surveyed, fearing without it, parental presumption in their favor “would become meaningless”). 
189
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
190
 Id. at 60.  
191
 Id. at 67.  
192
 Id. at 73; Solangel Maldonado, When Father (Or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents and 
Parental Deference after Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 881-882 (2003). 
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given to the parents’ decision if the parent had “sought to cut off visitation entirely.”
193
 
Courts not surprisingly have differed about what exactly Troxel requires to justify third 
party visitation, but clearly the court has the power to order such visitation under certain 
circumstances.
194
 Without doubt, a state statute could grant standing to an active sperm provider 
to seek visitation. In evaluating the claim, the court would have to give due deference to the 
parents’ wishes. If the parties agreed at the time of conception that the sperm provider would 
enjoy a right to visit, a strong argument can be made that the parent has ceded her parental 
preference, thus allowing enforcement of the active sperm provider’s rights based on the best 
interest of the child. In the absence of mutual intent, a sperm provider would nonetheless retain 
the possibility of demonstrating that a sufficient relationship with the child had developed to 
justify an award of visitation in the child’s best interests, but the challenge would be greater. 
Many states responded to Troxel by curtailing the opportunity for third parties to seek 
visitation. Although most states have statutes that allow grandparents the chance to seek 
visitation, many of these statutes grant standing and allow visitation only under highly 
circumscribed situations, such as where the grandparents have acted in a parental role, where a 
parent is deceased or divorced or separated, or where denial would cause harm to the child.
195
 
Cases where grandparents have won visitation against the objections of two united parents likely 
are rare.
196
 Even fewer states have statutes that grant stepparents standing to seek visitation—
persons who may have a stronger claim to visitation than active sperm providers because they 
lived with the child and in many cases will have shared in parenting the child.
197
 
Critics of this approach might argue that granting the sperm provider standing to pursue 
a claim to visitation infringes the parental autonomy of the parent(s) and undermines the integrity 
of the family. They may well claim that sperm providers do not necessarily enjoy a relationship 
with the child that differs from any number of other third parties, including grandparents, 
stepparents, aunts, uncles, family friends and nannies. However, active sperm providers are in a 
unique position.
198
 A child may have multiple grandparents and serial stepparents, but the child 
will only have one biological father. Scholars, courts and policy-makers have long debated the 
significance of that singular connection.
199
 We know from many quarters that biology is surely 
                                                                
193
 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71−72; See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (West 2015) (granting standing to 
grandparents denied visitation for longer than 90 days, ruled constitutional in Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. 
2002)). 
194
 Maldonado, supra note 192, at 869−70. 
195
 Id. at 873. 
196
 Id. at 874 (most states do not grant standing to grandparents to seek visitation where nuclear family 
intact); Id. at 885−86 (discussing courts that have required harm). 
197
 See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and 
Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 399−400 (2008) (discussing recognition of stepparents limited to those functioning as 
parents); DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 140, at 110 (reporting “only a handful of jurisdictions expressly conferring standing 
on stepparents to seek visitation). 
198
 See Bowe, supra note 187 (discussing common category of known sperm providers as “‘more than an 
uncle and less than a father.’”). 
199
 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 133, at 689−90 (arguing that children may experience psychological 
benefits from being raised by biological parents but reserving judgment on how much biology matters); Dara E. Purvis, 
Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 219 (2012) (noting “considerable doubt 
over whether biological connection yields better parenting”).  
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not parental destiny. The laws governing adoption and assisted reproduction are built on that 
premise. Thriving families created through collaborative reproduction and adoption are testament 
to the fact that a genetic connection is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure children’s well-
being. From a historical view, the primacy of the marital presumption at the expense of the 
biological father, though weaker today, also evidences that genetic connection and parentage do 
not automatically go together. 
But that truth does not mean that the genetic parent has nothing special to offer the child. 
The search by adoptees and donor offspring for their genetic parent(s) evidences the importance 
of that connection. For some, the question is one of curiosity, but others may desire to connect 
with that person.
200
 Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that some single women and lesbian 
couples choose to create families with a donor known to them. 
Moreover, the active sperm providers also have unique interests. They may experience 
the relationship with the child as distinct from other relationships because of the shared genetic 
connection.
201
 For gay men, donating to a lesbian friend or couple may offer their only chance for 
developing a meaningful relationship with their offspring. Gay men face their own struggles with 
parentage and discrimination. The options for becoming a gay father—surrogacy or adoption—
are time consuming, expensive, and not universally available.
202
 While gay men may, as we have 
seen, agree to a more limited, non-parental role, that concession does not necessarily signify that 
the expected relationship has little importance to them.
203
 Thus, sperm providers do stand apart 
from others who may come into the child’s life, and grow to know and even love them. 
Nonetheless, whether the child perceives the sperm provider as different in a positive 
way from others in his or her life assuredly varies from one child to another. Some children may 
call the sperm provider “Daddy” and view their relationship as meaningful in a special way. 
Although labels may bear little relation to emotional attachment,
204
 we cannot dismiss them 
altogether. For labels carry with them societal expectations that may influence how the child sees 
herself in relation to the adults in her life.
205
 For example, a child may have a wonderful, close 
                                                                
200
 Cahn, supra note 24, at 75−76 (discussing reasons why donor offspring search for donors and 
identifying curiosity as dominant motivation and observing that “For most people, searching for the donor . . . appears to 
be less about forming a relationship than allowing [them] to learn more about themselves.”). 
201
 See RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 145−49 (2011) 
(discussing that feelings of kinship with donor-conceived offspring occur even in men who donate anonymously, a feeling 
likely intensified when the donor gets to know the child); But see Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, 
and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 347, 384−85 (2008) (“[m]ost anonymous donors have no interest in having social and/or 
legal children when they donate sperm, and they do not develop such an interest later.”). 
202
 Bernstein, supra note 161, at 14. 
203
 See Bowe, supra note 187 (sharing stories of gay sperm providers comfortable with relinquishing 
parental rights, but concerned with forging significant relationships with the children and playing an active caretaking 
role). 
204
 See Sacha Coupet, “Ain’t I a Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the Debate Over 
Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 644 (2010) (“[a]n attachment figure exists by virtue 
of conduct, not labels.”).  
205
 For a discussion of the difficulties lesbian couple-headed families face in choosing the right descriptor 
for the involved donor, see Kelly, supra note 19, at 205−07; Bowe, supra note 187; Bernstein, supra note 161, at 48 
(describing Ry’s understanding of “the importance of father in our culture” and the relationship she developed with “the 
man she knew to be her father” as “the key fact of the case.”). 
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relationship with an aunt, but likely knows that the aunt occupies a non-parental category. How 
the child’s parents talk about and treat the sperm provider will also impact the relationship that 
develops, as will intangible interpersonal factors. Even children raised by both biological parents 
often have different quality relationships with each. Ultimately, it is impossible to know or to 
predict the nature of the attachment a particular child may form with an active sperm provider. 
The best we can say is that a disruption of the child’s relationship with the sperm provider may 
have negative consequences for some children that are worth trying to avoid. 
Concerns about Carl Schneider’s “expressive” function of family law may also counsel 
us to think carefully about the message our approach to active sperm providers will send. 
Perspectives differ about the underlying meaning expressed by gamete donation generally. Some 
view it as a message of commodification and commercialization, and decry the replacement of 
bonds of kinship with values of the marketplace.
206
 Others recognize the altruistic aspect of the 
practice—that donors assist others in creating families.
207
 At this point, most scholars generally 
accept the practice of gamete donation.
208
 While some might have lingering concerns about the 
willingness of donors to sever their potential parental connection to genetic offspring, particularly 
in a commercial context, the ultimate consequence has been the creation of family by those who 
strongly desire it, and the birth of children who fare overall just as well as children conceived 
otherwise.
209
 Moreover, studies of donors indicate their satisfaction with the process.
210
 Thus, I 
would argue that whatever concerns we have about the meta-message of gamete donation—that 
donors can and should disconnect from their offspring—it has not had long-term negative 
consequences for the donors. Further, while the debate still rages about the child’s desire to know 
about his or her genetic heritage, there is no indication of suffering by donor offspring because 
they have not been raised by one of their genetic parents. 
With active known donors, though, we are asking something more. Now we are no 
longer seeking solely the ability to create a family. We are inviting the donor to be a part of that 
family, albeit in some less than parental way. Yet at the same time, we are expecting, indeed 
insisting, that the donor not actually develop what some might see as a normal and desirable 
attachment to the child and vice versa—that the child likewise not develop an attachment to a 
biological parent. I am not sure how successfully human beings can achieve that kind of 
compartmentalization, and more importantly, I am not sure we want to encourage them to.
211
 
                                                                
206
 See Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 124. 
207
 Almeling, supra note 201 (discussing how agencies construct these differing narratives in how they 
recruit and market donors in a way that is strikingly gendered). 
208
 Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 117 (“[r]elatively few [scholars] advocate prohibiting the sale of 
gametes altogether.”). 
209
 Susan Golombok, et al., Social Versus Biological Parenting: Family Functioning and the 
Socioemotional Development of Children Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation, 40 J. OF CHILD PSYCHOL. AND 
PSYCHIATRY 519, 525 (1999); Susan Golombok, et al., Families with Children Conceived by Donor Insemination: A 
Follow-Up at Age Twelve, 73 CHILD DEV. 952, 953, 965 (2002). 
210
 Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition Divorce & Family Law Contracting: A Model for 
Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 400 (2013). 
211
 For a moving description of the difficulties faced by men in this position, see Bowe, supra note 187; 
See also Bernstein, supra note 161, at 26, 46−47 (suggesting sperm providers who have contact with the child may 
develop unexpected parental feelings, and discussing initial ambivalence of some gay donors that blossoms into deeper 
feeling). 
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Moreover, we would deny active sperm donors any ability to seek an ongoing 
relationship with the child even when he has invested labor in developing the relationship of a 
type that we normally would applaud as earning some kind of relationship with the child.
212
 For 
example, in Leckie v. Voorhies, the trial court held that the sperm donor did not satisfy the third 
party visitation statute because he did not have unique relationship with children beyond that of 
“excellent child care provider.” Rather than viewing the donor’s actions as an investment in 
caring for his child, the court denigrated his role as merely that of a babysitter.
213
 
I do not mean to suggest that providing a few hours of child care on an occasional basis 
makes a donor a father or even someone necessarily deserving of any rights to contact with the 
child. But, I do think we need to think about the message we are sending and be sensitive to the 
task we have undertaken. An analogy to surrogacy seems apt here. The practice of gestational 
surrogacy has gained a significant measure of acceptance, with states allowing surrogates to sever 
their potential parental rights prior to birth in favor of recognizing the intended parents as the 
child’s legal parents. We can accept the “gift of family” from gestational surrogates rather easily 
because they do not have the genetic connection to the child. By contrast, traditional surrogates 
engage in both the labor of parenting (gestation and delivery) and have a genetic connection to the 
child. In most places, a traditional surrogate will need to relinquish her rights to the child through 
adoption or at least a post-birth proceeding, which allows her to change her mind.
214
 A pre-birth 
order will not suffice. This distinction undoubtedly recognizes the difference in ability to manage 
the emotional aspects of gestating a child who is not otherwise connected to the surrogate and 
doing so for one who is. Likewise, those who donate gametes anonymously or with no active 
involvement in the child’s life may have little difficulty maintaining distance from their offspring, 
but nurturing a relationship between the sperm provider and the child may transform that 
relationship in a way that will cause harm to both the child and the adult if the relationship is 
severed. 
I have expressed trepidation about the conflicting message we send about men as parents 
in earlier work concerning unwed fathers and adoption.
215
 There I ultimately concluded that while 
we need to recognize the complicated message conveyed by requiring more of men to assert their 
parentage, the differential treatment is justified by other competing needs and values. The same is 
true here. I do not think we need to elevate active sperm providers to full-fledged legal fathers to 
send a “better” message about attachment with one’s offspring, but we do need to give some 
recognition to the existence of that relationship as something worthy of preserving at least if such 
a relationship was promised. Failure to do so would work an injustice for those sperm providers. 
Thus concerns for both the sperm provider and most importantly the children who may develop a 
significant and singular relationship with him, as well as the larger message for society, support 
finding some way for the law to protect that relationship. 
Critics will respond that the cost of preserving a valuable relationship for those children 
                                                                
212
 See Murray, supra note 197, at 427 (arguing for legal recognition of caregiving and caregivers that does 
not hew to the parental template). 
213
 Leckie v. Voorhies, No. 60-92-06326, at *3−4 (Or. Lane County Cir. Ct. 1993)  
(cited in Polikoff, supra note 7, at 71).  
214
 Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 215 (N.J. 1977); Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 432−433 (N.J. 1988).  
215
 Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
967, 1043−45 (1994). 
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who may have one—allowing a sperm provider to litigate the claim—is too high. Litigation 
inevitably raises the level of conflict between the parties and subjects all parties to the judge’s 
determination of “best interests,” which may or may not “get it right.” Judges may be overly-
inclined to find in favor of the sperm provider because they disapprove of single women or 
lesbian parents or simply because they have absorbed the sense of crisis about “fatherless 
families” that permeates our society.
216
 Critics will further argue that taking custody claims off of 
the table does little to lessen the possibility of conflict over the sperm provider’s role. To the 
contrary, it may spark more disputes as sperm providers who clearly could not qualify as fathers 
via some other channel (e.g. presumed parents) will be emboldened to insist on their “right” to 
visitation, which is the crux of the dispute in the vast majority of the cases to date.
217
 
These weighty concerns counsel against extending the law to allow active sperm 
providers to seek visitation based solely on conduct. This assertion reflects an attempt to balance 
the risks to all parties. Admittedly, from a theoretical standpoint, if the sperm provider has 
developed a relationship with the child, regardless of the initial intent, the relationship merits 
protection. As demonstrated, from the child’s and sperm provider’s perspective, the initial intent 
may matter not at all.
218
 However, from a psychological (and financial) perspective, the potential 
harm to the child from disruption of the relationship with an active sperm provider is likely to be 
less than the loss of a parent. Moreover, as discussed earlier, the parents’ agreement regarding the 
active sperm provider serves an important constitutional function—to rebut the Troxel parental 
preference, while simultaneously reducing the potential harm to the child and her parents from 
instability, uncertainty and litigation. All parties would know from the outset the sperm provider’s 
expected role and the legal rights attached to it. Relying on mutual intent at the outset would also 
provide some security that the active sperm provider would get the opportunity to develop the 
promised relationship, as the parent(s) would not need to fear encroaching rights on the part of the 
sperm provider. 
Fred Bernstein has proposed a presumption that visitation with an “involved” sperm 
donor approximating the time spent prior to litigation be in the child’s best interests.
219
 He argues 
that limiting the sperm provider’s claim in this fashion would sufficiently curb the expansion of 
the sperm provider’s rights to protect the family created by the mothers, but I think he overstates 
the extent of that security. From the parents’ perspective, if the active sperm provider could 
convert his visits—granted at their discretion—into “rights,” they might well eschew any 
involvement between the child and him. Moreover, Bernstein’s article predated Troxel, and his 
presumption might not pass muster now. 
                                                                
216
 See Fiser, supra note 139, at 19−20 (discussing potential for judicial bias when using the “best interest 
of the child” standard in assessing parental rights of gay individuals); cf. Kelly, supra note 19, at 201 (positioning debate 
about lesbian use of donor insemination in Canada as part of larger debate about the meaning of fatherhood, and in the 
context of “widespread moral panic about the prospect of ‘fatherless families.’”).  
217
 The only exceptions are those cases where the mother or the state seeks to characterize the sperm 
provider as a parent to impose a child support obligation on him. See generally Kansas ex rel. Sec’y Dep’t for Children & 
Families v. W.M., No. 12 D 2686 (Kan. Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2014); Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007); 
In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); In re Parentage of J.M.K., 119 P.3d 840 (Wash. 2005); 
Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); cf. E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011) 
(court refused to issue order terminating donor’s parental rights at mother’s and donor’s request). 
218
 Bernstein, supra note 161, at 34−35, 47. 
219
 Id. at 52. 
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Thus the better approach would limit standing to cases where the parents and sperm 
provider expressly agreed that the sperm provider would have visitation with the child or play an 
active role in the child’s life.
220
 In these circumstances, the parent has already conceded some of 
her parental autonomy
221
 and, particularly if the agreement preceded the donation, induced the 
donor to provide sperm by promising him a role in the child’s life. Fairness to the sperm provider 
dictates that such agreements be enforceable, always with the provision that the continued 
visitation be in the best interests of the child. 
The question still remains whether we should require that a post-donation contact 
agreement be in writing.
222
 In order to fully address this issue, we need to consider the fifth value 
I identified as significant for constructing our gamete donation legal regime: functionality. Before 
embarking on that task, two other family scenarios deserve attention. 
C. The Law Should Make Room For Families Contemplating More Than Two Parents 
Some lesbian couples choose to co-parent with the sperm provider and sometimes the 
provider’s partner as well.
223
 For these families, existing legal structures deny one or more of the 
child’s functional parents legal recognition. Either the father would be considered a donor without 
parental rights or one or both of the non-biological partners/parents would be considered at best a 
stepparent, if the couples were married. The law in some jurisdictions would recognize the lesbian 
or gay co-parent as a presumed parent if the child was conceived and born during the marriage
224
 
or if the parties intended the partner to act as a parent, and s/he did so.
225
 However, the sperm 
provider who intended to parent might also qualify as a presumed parent. In that case, the courts 
would likely feel compelled to identify only one as a legal parent—the standard operating 
procedure when two or more individuals can claim presumed parent status.
226
 
Yet good reasons support expanding the field of legal parenthood. Identifying three or 
even four adults committed financially and emotionally to the child’s care and nurture would 
serve to enhance child well-being. Research indicates that children can form significant 
attachments to multiple people.
227
 Children who have developed parental relationships with more 
                                                                
220
 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 82.  
221
 Maldonado, supra note 192, at 917 (“[B]y allowing a third party to . . . function as a parent to their 
children, by virtue of their own actions, the parents’ expectation of privacy in their relationship with their children is 
reduced.”). 
222
 See infra Part III.E.2.a. 
223
 BALL, supra note 178, at 130; Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between 
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 379, 398−99; MUNDY, supra note 21, at 97; Bernstein, supra note 161, at 17; Bowe, supra note 187 (describing one 
such family). 
224
 See In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 682−83 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2009) (declaring that child born to 
lesbian couple legally married in Netherlands would be child of both, but allowing adoption to protect family in other 
jurisdictions).  
225
 See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 665 (Cal. 2005).  
226
 Scott v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“[In a UPA matter,] there can be 
only two parents, not three.”). 
227
 Coupet, supra note 204, at 643. 
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than two adults may suffer harm from the loss of these relationships.
228
 Where all of the adults 
have agreed on the arrangement and have accepted the role as intended, legal recognition would 
not infringe parental rights and would further the goal of pluralism. Indeed, recognition might 
provide critical support for these families, enabling them to embrace their parental roles without 
fear of loss of access to the child in the event of a change in the relationship among the adults. 
There are two major interrelated risks of the arrangement. Multiple parent families may 
prove more fragile than two-parent or single parent households. Parenting can create considerable 
stress for parents, and reaching agreement on child-rearing questions can prove daunting even for 
two parents, let alone three or four.
229
 These challenges may increase the odds that the 
relationship(s) will dissolve, creating the potential for conflict and, ultimately, litigation among 
the various parents.
230
 A two-way struggle over a child can cause substantial harm; a three- or 
four-way struggle may heighten the tendency to treat the child as a piece of property to be fought 
over by the adults in her life.
231
 Others worry about compromising parental accountability.
232
 
These serious concerns should prompt caution but not foreclose the possibility 
altogether. Indeed, some municipalities have begun to recognize multiple parentage in their 
official records.
233
 At least two courts have already approved an arrangement recognizing three 
parents. In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, a Pennsylvania appellate court gave shared custody to the 
mother, her same-sex partner co-parent, and the sperm provider.
234
 The sperm provider had acted 
as an “integral part” of the children’s lives, and the partner acquired rights under in loco parentis, 
though the court did find the rights of the biological parent superior in the custody dispute.
235
 The 
appellate court rejected the trial court’s concern about the difficulty of calculating child support 
with more than two parents.
236
 
In LaChapelle v. Mitten, the biological mother, her same-sex partner, and the sperm 
provider (LaChapelle) and his partner had signed a contract granting the mothers legal and 
physical custody but providing the men with a “‘significant relationship’ with the child.”
237
 When 
the arrangement broke down, the trial court granted physical custody to the mother and joint legal 
                                                                
228
 Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (positing that child likely has a 
liberty interest “in preserving established familial or family-like bonds”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 
(1989) (guardian ad litem and court-appointed psychologist supported visitation rights for biological father of child born to 
married woman). 
229
 See Kelly, supra note 19, at 209 (relating concerns of lesbian mothers in study who supported 
expansion of two-parent model, namely potential for conflict and difficulty of decision-making with multiple parties). 
230
 Murray, supra note 197, at 445. 
231
 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 133, at 707−08. 
232
 Murray, supra note 197, at 445 (citing Carbone); HUNTINGTON, supra note 139, at 171. 
233
 See, e.g., Abigale Subdhan, Vancouver Baby Becomes First Person to Have Three Parents Named on 
Birth Certificate in B.C., NAT’L POST, Feb. 10, 2014, http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/vancouver-baby-
becomes-first-person-to-have-three-parents-named-on-birth-certificate-in-b-c#__federated=1.  
234
 Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
235
 Id. at 482. 
236
 Id. 
237
 LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
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custody and visitation to her partner. The court also adjudicated LaChapelle the father, ordering 
him to pay child support and providing for visitation. On appeal, the court affirmed the order, 
finding that it did not create an “impermissible ‘triumvirate’ parenting scheme,” as the mother 
argued, since the father was not designated a “joint . . . custodian.”
238
 The court viewed its 
“‘paramount commitment’ in all matters involving court-established relationships” as the “best 
interests of the child.”
239
 
California has taken the bold step of enacting legislation that explicitly contemplates 
recognition of a third legal parent under special circumstances.
240
 These precedents suggest that 
legal recognition of multiple parents has a place in family law. I do not pretend here to undertake 
a comprehensive analysis of the perils and positives of that development in all contexts. But some 
form of acknowledgment in this situation seems warranted, as long as it is done with care.
241
 
Where the sperm provider and lesbian mothers contemplate his role as a co-equal parent from 
inception, and where the sperm provider actually fulfills that role, the law should acknowledge the 
existence of all parents. Concerns about dividing up time with the child or support obligations can 
be addressed by the trial court as always with the goal of furthering the child’s best interests. 
D. Intentions Are Important, But They Are Not Everything: Preserving Functional Parenthood 
Thus far I have argued for categorizing the sperm provider based on mutual intent. Our 
last scenario tests the limits of that approach and is perhaps the most challenging. In these cases, 
the parties may have contemplated that the sperm provider act solely as a donor, but the deliberate 
involvement of the donor in the child’s life creates a relationship between the donor and child that 
can take on a life of its own and that may itself deserve respect. The question then becomes 
whether the law should allow for parental recognition based on conduct when the child is 
conceived by directed sperm donation. In other words, can functional parenthood co-exist with 
intent-based parenthood? 
These situations challenge the intent-based paradigm that underlies much of the law 
governing ART. A bedrock principle of the law of assisted reproduction is that rights and 
responsibilities of the participants, most especially the question of parentage, should be decided 
based on the parties’ preconception intention. A number of scholars have advocated this view, 
242
 
                                                                
238
 Id. at 161. 
239
 Id. at 158. 
240
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2015) (allows recognition where recognizing only two parents would 
cause detriment to the child). The ALI Principles also contemplates the possibility of more than two parents, though the 
restrictions on who would qualify makes the specifics challenging for lesbian couples co-parenting with the sperm 
provider. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 
(2000). 
241
 For a more in-depth analysis of accommodating multiple parents, see Jacobs, supra note 158; Boskey, 
supra note 182; Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men Involved in 
the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 970−72 (2009); M. Scott Serfozo, Sperm Donor 
Child Support Obligations: How Courts and Legislatures Should Properly Weigh the Interests of Donor, Donee, and 
Child, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 715, 733−34 (2008); Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context 
of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1751 (2013).  
242
 Storrow, supra note 7, at 643; Purvis, supra note 199, at 212; John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty 
and the Control of Concept, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 460−61 (1983); John Lawrence Hill, What 
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and laws governing surrogacy (where permitted and addressed) consider intent a critical 
component of determining parentage, although other characteristics may also come into play, such 
as marital status.
243
 Moreover, all of the family configurations contemplated thus far have been 
defined by the parties’ intent—whether to parent solo, with an opposite-sex or same sex co-
parent, to include the donor as an active non-parent part of the child’s life, or to expand parental 
status to more than two individuals who intended to fulfill that role. 
Relying on intent in the directed gamete donation context at least partially serves all of 
the substantive values we have identified as salient. It embodies the notion of pluralism by leaving 
room for families to order their legal roles as they see fit. It honors the adults’ autonomy and 
treats them fairly by allowing them to choose to conceive through assisted reproduction with 
agreed-on expectations about the roles the various participants will—or won’t—play. And it 
serves the interests of children by promoting stability and certainty regarding the adult(s) who will 
be responsible for them. Finally, as Dara Purvis argues, if we consider the expressive and 
channeling functions of family law, using intent to define parentage promotes “responsible, 
nurturing, child-focused parenting.”
244
 
Yet assigning parental roles based solely on intention does not serve these values in 
every instance.
245
  In some situations, relying on intent disserves children, treats an adult unfairly, 
and ignores the pluralistic reality of how the family actually operates.
246
 Nor is there inevitably a 
strong justification for ART exceptionalism—exempting “families conceived through assisted 
reproduction, specifically gamete donation—from the other rules of family law. Admittedly, a 
significant problem to date has been the awkward application of laws designed before the advent 
of assisted reproduction to resolve ART disputes. In many instances involving ART, most notably 
gestational surrogacy, laws drafted specifically to address that arrangement function much more 
effectively than pre-existing family law rules for everyone involved. But creating a legal regime 
that treats parentage of children conceived through ART wholly differently from parentage 
created through sexual reproduction, or outside that context, in every instance carries its own set 
of problems. 
Jason P. v. Danielle S. is a case in point.
247
 In that case, the parties had a long-term 
                                                                
Does It Mean to be A “Parent”? The Claims of Biology As the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 385−86 
(1991); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender 
Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323 (1990). 
243
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 517 (Cal. 1993) (intent as “tie-breaker” to determine 
maternity in gestational surrogacy case); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 801 (Conn. 2011) (intended parent recognized 
as parent if valid gestational surrogacy agreement); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2015) (provides means for declaring 
intended parents legal parents in gestational surrogacy situation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2015) (recognizes 
intended parents as legal parents in gestational surrogacy, but only for married couples); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6 
(West 2015) (recognizes parentage of intended parents of child born to gestational surrogate); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-
15-801-03 (West 2015) (gestational surrogacy contract valid if intended parents are married). 
244
 Purvis, supra note 199, at 221. 
245
 Cf. id. at 229 (noting lack of consensus regarding interaction of intent with other understandings of 
parentage). 
246
 Cf. Murray, supra note 197, at 390 (arguing that family law “be attentive to and responsive to the 
question of how families actually perform their caregiving”). 
247
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
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romantic relationship for several years. According to Jason, they had pursued parenthood 
together, first by attempting to conceive naturally and then by fertility treatment: two rounds of 
IUI for Danielle and a surgical procedure for Jason.
248
  A year later, Danielle moved out and 
began investigating single motherhood via anonymous sperm donation, though she later moved 
back into Jason’s house during a remodel of her home. The parties disputed their intentions at the 
time of the IVF cycle that resulted in the birth of the child at issue—Gus. After Gus’s birth, the 
parties continued to have contact. Gus called Jason “dada,” and Danielle and Gus stayed with 
Jason on visits to New York, where he was residing.
249
 
The evidence regarding their intent at the time of the IVF was a bit equivocal, with Jason 
authoring a letter some months prior plainly stating he did not want to be a father and yet signing 
standard consent forms identifying him as an “Intended Parent” at the time of treatment.
250
 
Although the trial court found that he was a “donor” under the California insemination statute, 
section 7613(b),
251
 this ruling did not clearly rest on a factual determination regarding the intent 
of the parties,
252
 since prior precedent interpreted section 7613(b) as a bright-line rule that a man 
who donated sperm used to inseminate a non-spouse under the supervision of a physician was a 
donor without regard to intent or subsequent conduct.
253
 In Steven S. v. Deborah D., the parties 
had engaged in a physical relationship over a period of months, though Steven was married to 
someone else at the time.
254
 Steven attended Deborah’s insemination and ultrasound 
appointments, as well as joint therapy to discuss issues related to the child, who apparently called 
him “Daddy.” The child also had Steven’s last name as his middle name. When the child was 
three, Steven filed for paternity. Deborah opposed the petition. The parties disputed whether the 
child was conceived via sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. The trial court found the 
latter, and the appellate court held that the artificial insemination statute cut off any rights Steven 
might have had because the sperm had been provided to a physician.
255
 
In Jason P., the court of appeals followed Steven S. insofar as it agreed that Jason was a 
“donor” under 7613(b).
256
 However, the court departed from the harsh rule of Steven S. by 
reversing the nonsuit granted by the trial court and allowing Jason to attempt to prove to the trial 
court that he qualified as a father under California’s presumed father statute, section 7611(d), 
because he received Gus into his home, and held him out as his own.
257
 News reports indicate that 
                                                                
248
 Id. at 791. 
249
 Id. at 792. 
250
 Id. 
251
 Id.  
252
 The trial court apparently did make factual findings that Jason did not intend to be a parent, but the 
appellate court did not expressly mention those findings in its analysis of 7613(b). However, its rejection of Jason’s claim 
for equitable estoppel supports that inference, as the court found that he did not donate in reliance on promises by Danielle 
that he would be a parent. Id. at 797−98. 
253
 Id. at 795. 
254
 Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 484–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
255
 Id. at 488. 
256
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
257
 Id. at 795. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2015).  
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he was successful in that endeavor.
258
 
By allowing Jason to proceed through this avenue, the court in essence held that donor 
status created under 7613(b), regardless of intent at that time, was not sacrosanct. Subsequent 
conduct could change a “donor” into a “father.” The ruling provoked consternation, worry, and 
critique from various quarters of the ART community and understandably so.
259
 It threatened to 
inject yet another vein of uncertainty into the use of donated gametes and violate the familial 
integrity and parental rights of single mothers and lesbian couples with donor-conceived children. 
While the reaction was understandable, Jason P. does not necessarily represent the assault on 
donor-conceived families and single mothers that critics fear. 
Viewed from the broadest vantage point, the prior precedent, Steven S., represented an 
approach that was likely doomed to failure in one way or another. As we saw in cases from other 
jurisdictions, statutes that operate as a complete bar to assertion of parental rights by men who 
provide sperm for insemination of a non-spouse in every circumstance are both unconstitutional 
and bad policy. Indeed, the California legislature implicitly recognized the problem by amending 
its statute (after Danielle conceived Gus) to allow a sperm provider who uses a physician to at 
least be considered a parent by written agreement.
260
 
Jason P. goes further of course, in looking beyond intent to consider subsequent conduct 
of the parties. But Jason P. was not the first California case to look beyond intent to parent. In 
K.M. v. E.G., the California Supreme Court decided a dispute between former lesbian partners 
over a child gestated by one, E.G., with an egg provided by the other, K.M.
261
 The couple lived 
together until the child was five and acted as co-parents during that time. When they split, E.G. 
cut off K.M.’s access to the child. When K.M. sued to establish parentage, the women disputed 
their intentions at the time of the IVF. E.G. insisted she always intended to be a single mother; 
K.M. insisted she would not have donated unless she, too, would be considered the child’s 
mother. The trial court found E.G. more credible and ruled that K.M. had not intended to act as a 
parent at the time she donated. Analogizing to the artificial insemination statute (which did not 
address egg donation), the trial court thus classified K.M. as a donor with no parental status.
262
 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed. Although it did not disturb the trial 
court’s factual ruling regarding intent, the Court carved out an exception when the parties intend 
to raise the child in their joint home.
263
 The Court acknowledged that the insemination statute was 
extended to allow unmarried women to avail themselves of artificial insemination, but concluded 
that the legislature could not have intended to “expand the reach of this provision so far that it 
would apply if a man provided semen to be used to impregnate his unmarried partner in order to 
produce a child that would be raised in their joint home. It would be surprising, to say the least, to 
                                                                
258
 Michele Corriston, Jason Patric Declared Legal Parent of His Son: Report, PEOPLE (Nov. 03, 2014, 
7:30 PM), http://www.people.com/article/jason-patric-declared-legal-father-gus. 
259
 Amicus Curiae Letter to Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye & Associate Justices of the California 
Supreme Court from Reproductive Technology and Family Law Scholars in support of petition seeking review of Jason P. 
v. Danielle S. (on file with the author).  
260
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2015). 
261
 K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 63–64 (Cal. 2005).  
262
 Id. at 66. 
263
 Id. at 71-72. 
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conclude that the Legislature intended such a result.”
264
 
K.M. is an odd opinion. It bolsters its conclusion by reference to In Interest of R.C., 
which involved a man who provided sperm on the understanding that he would be a parent. Yet 
the K.M. court conceded that the intent in the case before it was disputed. It nonetheless found 
that the UPA should not apply if the women intended to raise the child in their joint home. 
Interestingly, the Court found the facts in K.M.’s favor even more compelling than those in R.C. 
because the sperm provider and mother in R.C. were merely “friends,” while K.M. and E.G. were 
“more than ‘friends’ . . . they lived together and were registered domestic partners.”
265
 Yet the 
Court did not rely on the fact that the two women acted as co-parents after the child’s birth. To the 
contrary, the Court expressly rejected K.M.’s attempt to establish parentage by qualifying under 
7611(d), not because gamete donors were ineligible to be considered presumed parents under that 
provision, but because K.M. had kept her genetic connection to the children secret, as she and 
E.G. had agreed.
266
  Hence, although K.M. acted as a parent and openly held herself out as a “co-
parent,” because she did not hold the children out as “her own” in a genetic sense, that avenue 
was closed to her. 
The Court’s treatment of K.M.’s 7611(d) claim suggests that even where a donor did not 
initially intend to parent, conduct meeting 7611(d)’s requirement could form the basis for 
establishing parentage. It thus laid the groundwork for the Jason P. decision.
267
 However, given 
the Court’s ruling on this point, it is hard to discern the Court’s rationale for relying on the 
parties’ plan to raise the child in their joint home as the determinant of parental status. The K.M. 
opinion never really explains why intent to raise a child in a joint home should determine 
parentage, if the parties agreed that only one of the women would be the parent. Did the Court on 
some level doubt the trial court’s ruling on intent to parent? It does seem strange that K.M. would 
have donated and done all that she did in terms of parenting after the child’s birth without an 
expectation that she would be a parent, but perhaps at the time of conception she was not 
concerned about the legalities of parenthood and was happy to reassure E.G. that she alone would 
be the “legal” parent. Or was the Court moved by the fact that their household resembled a 
traditional two-parent model? Both sides of the extended family viewed themselves as 
grandparents, aunts, and uncles; third parties, like the nanny, considered both women to be 
mothers. Or does the subtext of the opinion make a larger point—that a person cannot control 
legal parentage simply by declaring that she wants to be a single parent if she otherwise acts as if 
the child has two parents? 
E.G. and, to a lesser degree perhaps, Danielle S., wanted to have their parental cake and 
eat it too. They wanted to ensure exclusive legal control over their children, but they also wanted 
the other genetic parent to play a role in the child’s life. In E.G.’s case she worried about a 
custody battle if the couple broke up
268
 and basically wanted to ensure that she would win because 
she was the only legal parent. But E.G. did not act like the only legal parent. From the moment of 
conception, she planned to raise the child with K.M., and her actions after the birth were 
consistent with that plan. 
                                                                
264
 Id. at 69.  
265
 Id. at 70. 
266
 Id. at 73.  
267
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). 
268
 K.M., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64; BALL, supra note 178, at 125. 
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The contradiction is less striking in Danielle’s case, but nonetheless present. In 
Danielle’s case, she may well have intended to act as a single parent at the time of the IVF cycle, 
but her actions after birth invited Jason to participate in her child’s life and encouraged his 
relationship with Gus. Indeed, Jason alleged that when Gus was only two months old, Danielle 
sent an email to a cousin acknowledging the growing relationship between the two and Jason’s 
developing attachment to Gus.
269
 Moreover, the conflicting evidence of intent coupled with the 
romantic history of the couple and their earlier efforts to start a family together, cannot help but 
leave the reader—and perhaps the appellate court—with lingering doubts about the parties’ actual 
intent and the nature of their relationship.
270
 As far as post-birth conduct, neither the initial trial 
court nor the appellate opinion decided whether Jason’s involvement rose to the level of parent as 
required by 7611(d). The media reported that he prevailed on remand, but without access to the 
factual findings of the trial court, it is difficult to evaluate whether, as the appellate court 
emphasized, his relationship with Gus rose to the level of a “demonstrated familial 
relationship.”
271
 
The jurisprudence of section 7611(d) demonstrates a progressive broadening of the 
means of establishing parentage. Originally designed to provide a way to establish paternity that 
substituted for marriage to the mother and proof of genetic parenthood, cases over the last decade 
have interpreted section 7611(d) to encompass parental figures who would never be mistaken for 
a “natural” parent, including same sex partners and men who have been ruled out as biological 
fathers.
272
 The focus in these cases has been on the assumption of the parental role and the 
existence of an actual, developed relationship with the child—in other words, legal recognition 
premised on functional parenthood.
273
 
                                                                
269
 Answer of Plaintiff and Appellant Jason P. to Petition for Review, Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d (2014) (No. S219507), 2014 WL 3900147, at *12.  
270
 See Coupet, supra note 204, at 618−22 (discussing dyadic/conjugal underpinnings of family law and 
parentage). 
271
 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 796−97. In a reply brief supporting her petition for review in the 
California Supreme Court, Danielle recited a litany of facts showing that Jason scrupulously avoided disclosure of his 
identity as the genetic father and provided little in the way of care for Gus prior to filing his action for paternity. Reply in 
Support of Petition for Review, Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d (2014) (No. S219507), 2014 WL 4408351. Not 
surprisingly, Jason’s brief made contrary assertions: that Danielle spoke after Gus’ birth of her hope that she and Jason 
might marry and that he join her family with Gus; that she identified Jason as Gus’ father on a preschool application, 
which he jointly signed; and that he contributed financially to the cost of preschool and other expenses. Answer of 
Plaintiff and Appellant Jason P. to Petition for Review, Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d (2014) (No. S219507), 
2014 WL 3900147, at *12. 
272
 See In re Nicholas H., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 151−52 (Cal. 2002) (holding man who admitted he was 
not biological father remains a presumed father under CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d)); Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 
46, 58 (Cal. 2005) (holding former same-sex partner was presumed parent under CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) to child she 
co-parented). 
273
 Nicholas H., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152 (“The courts have repeatedly held, in applying paternity 
presumptions, that the extant father-child relationship is to be preserved at the cost of biological ties.”); S.Y. v. S.B., 134 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 11−12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (purpose is to distinguish fathers with familial relationship who have 
“demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare.”).  
There have also been cases where presumed parenthood could be established by a demonstrated commitment to the parent 
that had been thwarted before an actual relationship with the child could ripen. See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 615, 619 (Cal. 1992) (en banc). 
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The “holding out” standard under 7611(d) does not resolve the question of parentage. It 
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of parentage that can be defeated by clear and 
convincing evidence that the presumed parent is not the child’s biological parent, or that the 
presumed parent has not developed a father-child relationship with the child.
274
  The problem with 
Jason P. is not that it offers the opportunity for some donors to prove that they are actually 
parents, but that section 7611(d) may provide too low a bar for donors to surmount and that the 
law offers only two options—parent or stranger. It might be easy to prove from the undisputed 
facts that Jason had some kind of family relationship with Gus. But “family” does not equal 
“parent.” Aunts, uncles, and cousins, after all, are family, but treated very differently by the law 
than parents.
275
 Section 7611(d) should not grant Jason parentage as a man with a genetic tie to 
the child merely for claiming the child as his own and “receiving the child into his home,” unless 
he takes on the actual responsibilities of parenthood and proves he has developed a parental-type 
relationship with the child. Without such a stringent standard, a sperm donor could too easily 
renounce the terms of the donation simply by declaring to others that he was the biological father 
of the child and managing to convince the mother to let the child visit him in his home. However, 
if the sperm donor does assume the mantle of parenthood, and particularly if the child perceives 
him as such, our first value, fostering child well-being, argues for allowing legal recognition of 
the relationship that exists.
276
 As Carlos Ball aptly reasoned in discussing K.M., even if E.G. “held 
fast to the view that she was the only legal parent, the important point is that the twins, because of 
that permission, came to view [K.M.] as a parent.”
277
 
Some will argue that the donor-now-parent legal recognition violates the values of 
parental rights and pluralism by attacking the mother’s right to parent exclusively. Single mothers 
may understandably fear that bias against single parent families or women will lead courts to 
favor the donor in assessing the nature of the relationship. Scholars have long noted the “double-
standard” that too often emerges in family law matters, where men’s relatively minimal 
contribution to parenting are extolled, while women’s investment in work undermine their efforts 
to win custody.
278
 On the other hand, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that when it 
comes to unwed fathers, in some contexts, the very structure of the law operates to marginalize 
                                                                
274
 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 938. The presumption can also be rebutted if the presumed parent has failed to 
show that she “actively participated in causing the [child] to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise the 
children as her own together with the birth mother; that she voluntarily accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood 
after the children were born; and that there are no competing claims to her being the children’s second parent.”; Charisma 
R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). This method of qualifying under CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7611(d) would be inapplicable in a case such as Jason P., where Jason and Danielle did not intend at the time of 
conception that Jason would raise the child as his own. 
275
 In re Spencer W., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that presumed father status 
requires showing “substantial familial relationship,” not merely “some” familial relationship). 
276
 See BALL, supra note 178, at 140. (“The law should not allow a parent to rely on original intent to sever 
a later-established parental bond between her then partner and the children . . . .”); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra 
note 177, at 426 (arguing in favor of legal recognition for functional parents, though subordinate to formal parents’ rights).  
277
 BALL, supra note 178, at 140. 
278
 Cheri L. Wood, Childless Mothers? - - The New Catch-22: You Can’t Have Your Kids and Work for 
Them Too, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 383, 384−85 (1995); Amy D. Ronner, Women Who Dance on the Professional Track: 
Custody and the Red Shoes, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174 (2000) (citing Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1153 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d en banc (July 14, 1999)). 
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their parental status.
279
 
The way to combat the potential for bias against the mother rests in the careful 
application of the standard. If the donor can truly show a parent-type relationship, it would be 
extremely unlikely, indeed virtually impossible, for a man to achieve that kind of relationship 
with the child without the mother’s implicit consent. From a parental rights perspective then, the 
mother arguably has ceded her right to exclusivity. Recognizing the donor’s parental rights in this 
likely unusual circumstance likewise serves the value of pluralism because it respects and protects 
the actual family relationship that has developed, rather than hewing to a fiction that the child 
only has one parent. We should also not confuse respecting single parent families or leveling the 
playing field with privileging them. Women who conceive via sexual intercourse have no ability 
to limit the involvement of the biological father. Indeed, the state can bring the father into the 
equation even when both the mother and father prefer his absence.
280
 
Two California cases have had occasion to consider the limits of single parent 
exclusivity in a related context. In L.M. v. M.G., M.G. had completed a single parent adoption of a 
child when she was living with L.M.
281
 They had lived together as same-sex partners for five 
years and were raising children from prior relationships. The couple raised the child together until 
they separated, when the child was three. The partner remained involved in the child’s life based 
on an informal arrangement for another six years, until the mother decided to move to Europe. At 
that point, L.M. sued to establish parentage. The trial court ruled that she was a presumed parent 
under section 7612, and the appellate court affirmed. M.G. argued that the single parent adoption 
decree established her exclusive right to parental status—that “the adoption decree constitutes a 
judicial determination that ‘this is not a two slot parent family. It is a one slot parent 
family . . . .’”
282
 The court rejected the claim, reasoning that “there is no basis to characterize the 
adoption decree as establishing that, regardless of future developments, the Child should be 
limited to only one parent.”
283
 
Another California appellate court reached a similar conclusion in an interesting twist on 
the usual donor case. In R.M. v. T.A., the mother began a relationship with a man, R.M.
284
 At the 
time, she intended to become a single parent through artificial insemination. She moved from 
Louisiana, where R.M. lived, to San Diego to pursue that goal on her own. The relationship with 
R.M., which ended on her move, resumed while she was pursuing artificial insemination. R.M. 
had provided sperm for this purpose to a San Diego sperm bank, but the mother instead used 
anonymously donated sperm. R.M. was unaware of this fact until the mother became pregnant. 
R.M. claimed that the mother asked him to be a father to the child, and he agreed, before she 
became pregnant. The mother vigorously denied this allegation, pointing to the years she had 
attempted to conceive via artificial insemination. Nonetheless, R.M. visited the mother several 
times during the pregnancy, was present at a sonogram and a birthing class, drove the mother to 
the hospital while in labor, was at the hospital when the child was born, and spent several nights 
                                                                
279
 See Forman, supra note 215, at 971; NANCY DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 90−91 (2000). 
280
 Everett v. Everett, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).  
281
 L.M. v. M.G., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
282
 Id. at 105. 
283
 Id. See also S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that parenthood under 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) need not arise simultaneously with biological or adoptive parenthood). 
284
 R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
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in the hospital due to medical issues with the child. He did not sign a VAP (though he did for a 
second child he and the mother conceived naturally), claiming the hospital never offered him one. 
Nor did he object when the mother told the staff she had conceived via sperm donation and left 
“father” blank on the birth certificate.
285
 
After the birth, the parties continued a long-distance relationship. The mother and child 
spent extended visits in Louisiana living with R.M. R.M. paid for many expenses related to the 
child, prepared his home to accommodate her and engaged in numerous activities and outings 
with the child and with the child and the mother. Cards and artwork received from the mother on 
behalf of the child identified him as father, and both the child and mother referred to him as 
“Daddy.”
286
 
The parties subsequently had a child together. At that time, the relationship deteriorated, 
and the mother refused to let R.M. visit. The trial court acknowledged the mother’s “substantial 
emotional and financial investment . . . to become a single parent” of the first child, but 
nonetheless concluded that R.M. satisfied the presumed parent criteria.
287
 The appellate court 
upheld the trial court’s ruling. In doing so, the court addressed each of the three substantive values 
I have identified. The court began by noting the mother’s fundamental constitutional right to 
parent, guaranteed by Troxel v. Granville.
288
 The court went on to recognize that “a child’s best 
interests is a core public policy concern that underlies statutory enactments and judicial decisions 
in this arena,” as well as the constitutional rights of the parent, and further that “numerous statutes 
in a broad array of contexts . . . seek to ensure a child’s well-being while also protecting the 
liberty interests of parents to raise their children without undue interference by the state or third 
parties.”
289
 In terms of pluralism, the court made clear that the parentage presumption did not 
“seek to impose a two-parent choice to the detriment of a single-parent choice,” but rather “to 
further a two-parent familial arrangement that has already been developed in the parenting of the 
child.”
290
 For the same reason, the court rejected the mother’s claim that the parentage 
presumption infringed her “constitutional right to form a single-parent family.”
291
 In the court’s 
view, once the child has developed a parent-child relationship with a second person, “the child’s 
welfare . . . trumps the claimed single-parent choice because a two-parent family relationship has 
already been established for the child.”
292
 The court also clarified that when applying the 
parentage presumption, the court should only consider the law’s preference for two-parent 
                                                                
285
 Id. at 841. 
286
 Id. at 842−43. 
287
 Id. at 844. 
288
 Id. at 845 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). 
289
 Id. at 846. 
290
 Id. at 848. 
291
 Id. at 849-51. Although not addressed by the court, it is worth noting that such a constitutional right has 
never been recognized and indeed, it is unlikely courts would find such a right, as women who conceive sexually have 
zero ability to maintain a single parent family. It is difficult to fathom a distinction sufficient to justify finding a 
fundamental constitutional right triggering strict scrutiny, as the mother argued. Finding that the parentage presumption or 
other family laws violated equal protection by burdening single women or single parents might prove more successful. 
292
 Id.  
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families at the rebuttal stage, after it has determined that a presumed parent exists.
293
 
The mother did make a couple of intriguing arguments worth noting. First, she argued 
that the law should draw an “‘articulable distinction’ between a presumed parent and other 
familial figures and caregivers . . . .”
294
 She is correct: as I have argued in critiquing Jason P., the 
“parentage” presumption should use criteria aimed at discerning true parental figures. The 
standard used by the courts seeks that end, but no legal rule achieves its ideal in application one 
hundred percent of the time. While the facts reported in the Jason P appellate opinion might give 
us pause regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate a parent-child relationship, the 
case for R.M. seems very strong. 
The mother also argues that the law should not deter single women from forming 
romantic attachments or marrying. But as the court pointed out, the mother’s behavior went far 
beyond mere dating. She lived with the father and fostered a parent-child relationship from the 
time the child was born. The presumption “incorporates mechanisms to ensure that a parent who 
makes a decision to be a single parent will not subsequently be required to share that parenting 
with another person unless the court is satisfied the parent permitted the person to engage with the 
child at a level that transforms the interaction into a full, openly acknowledged two-parent 
relationship.”
295
 
To the extent that allowing a sperm provider to attempt to prove parentage this way 
undermines the mother’s choice to parent exclusively, that is the price of inviting someone to 
assume that role in the child’s life. The desire to respect single parent families must yield to the 
needs of the child—not based on an abstract preference for two-parent families, or even on the 
tangible financial gains that might accrue from identifying a second parent, but because of the 
prospect of emotional harm that may result from severing a parent-like emotional bond between 
the donor—now father—and child.
296
 As one Florida judge put it, in evaluating a claim by a 
lesbian co-parent: 
For the . . . parents, the facts of having engendered, borne, or given birth to a child 
produce an understandable sense of preparedness for proprietorship and possessionness. 
These considerations carry no weight with children who are emotionally unaware of the 
events leading to their births. What registers in their minds are the day-to-day 
interchanges with the adults who take care of them and who, on the strength of these, 
become the parent figures to whom they are attached.
297
 
                                                                
293
 Id. at 848. 
294
 Id. at 849. 
295
 Id.  
296
 Storrow, supra note 7, at 667 (citing Bartlett—criticizing exclusive parenthood/failure to recognize 
functional parents because of “the child’s need for continuity in intimate relationships.”). See Purvis, supra note 199, at 
226 (“Functional theories [of parenthood] are premised explicitly on protecting the child’s emotional and psychological 
well-being.”); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 177, at 439 (recognizing harm to children from breaking bond 
with functional parent); Coupet, supra note 204, at 645 (“The child’s perspective provides a . . . persuasive basis for 
extending parental status to those individuals whom the child regards as parents.”). 
297
 Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (Van Nortwick, J., concurring) 
(citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (1973); See also W.R.L. v. A.H., No. 
2014-CA-001240-ME, 2015 WL 1746240, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015) (Maze, J., concurring) (pleading for recognition of 
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In evaluating the effect on the child, though, we must take into account the emotional 
cost of uncertainty and potential litigation to the child. We know from research on children of 
divorce that the adjustment of the primary parent, the level of instability in the child’s life, and the 
level of conflict between the parents all can impact the child’s well-being.
298
 Indeed, it was 
precisely these concerns that led me to conclude that an active sperm provider should acquire 
limited rights to visit only where his active involvement was intended by all parties and not based 
on conduct alone. As a general matter, legal rules that minimize the opportunity for conflict serve 
children’s interests. 
However, the desire to avoid conflict among the adults in the child’s life only goes so 
far. More than fifty years ago, child development experts Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit 
recommended a legal regime that would vest all authority over children in their custodial 
parent.
299
 But that view has never held sway with policy makers in disputes between parents. 
Rather, a fundamental principle of custody law vests both parents with a right to seek custody, 
and presumes that except in very unusual circumstances, the other parent will either share custody 
or enjoy the privilege of visitation with the child.
300
 Many states now have explicitly enunciated a 
policy in favor of continuing contact with both parents.
301
 We know, from human experience as 
well as the extensive number of cases litigating rights of same-sex partners, that given the option 
of excluding the other parent from their child’s life, some parents would exercise that option if the 
law did not require them to behave differently. Hence, while a regime that minimizes the need for 
judicial dispute resolution should be a goal, we cannot assume that the risk of conflict is so great 
that it must outweigh the harm that would result from cutting a child off from a parent.
302
 
Nor again is there anything unique to the method of conception that dictates a more 
compelling need for certainty from the child’s perspective. The adults using ART may feel a 
stronger claim to certainty because they sought out procreation by ART in order to ensure 
exclusive parenthood (or avoid parenthood) or because they relied on a particular understanding 
in deciding to procreate via gamete donation.
303
 But if the parties themselves deviated from that 
understanding, the strength of their claims weakens significantly. 
Ultimately, the concerns about introducing uncertainty into the family constellation—
and the potential for conflict along with it—are inherent in any recognition of functional 
parenthood.
304
 Yet scholars and advocates have made a strong case for expanding our definition 
                                                                
child’s interests in preserving family-like bonds). 
298
 Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’ Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILD. 
143, 150−51 (1994); See also Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 
28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 496−97 (referencing thirty years of research demonstrating detriment caused to children 
from high-conflict custody battles); Baker, supra note 133, at 684−85 (children often hurt by conflict and animosity of 
divorce).  
299
 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 297 at 38.  
300
 DOUGLAS ABRAMS, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 775 (3d ed. 2012). 
301
 J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and 
Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 217 (2014). 
302
 Garrison, supra note 24, at 909. 
303
 See supra note 134-36 and accompanying text. 
304
 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 140, at 106 (“As our legal framework is rebuilt with functional materials 
replacing biological ones, much is gained, much is lost. Fairness and accuracy are the winners . . . But the move to 
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of parentage, and the law has increasingly responded. Not all states have been persuaded. 
305
 But 
where a state does recognize functional parenthood, no justification exists for excluding sperm 
donors who become functional parents from that recognition. While I argued earlier that the risk 
of litigation was too great to allow an active sperm provider to seek visitation based solely on 
conduct,
306
 the balance of risks plays out differently here. Loss of someone who acted as a parent 
is likely to prove more harmful to the child than the lost connection to someone who played a less 
central role in the child’s life. Moreover, the difficulty of establishing functional parenthood, as 
compared to active involvement by a sperm provider, should deter sperm providers from pursuing 
litigation without a strong basis for making the claim.
307
 We may also find that providing limited 
rights to active sperm providers, as I have advocated, may effectively decrease claims based on 
functional parentage as this option may prove popular among men who do not at the outset 
contemplate parenthood. 
From a theoretical standpoint, allowing this change in status does not inevitably signify 
an abandonment of intent as a critical marker for establishing legal rights at birth. To the contrary, 
some would argue that intent-based parenthood and functional parenthood are merely variations 
on a theme. For Katharine Baker, contract does and should explain parentage. Her definition of 
contract is expansive. It encompasses not just express written contracts like we find in some 
assisted reproduction cases, but also parentage created through implied contract,
308
 by which 
some non-biological fathers have acquired legal status, and parenthood created by contracts in 
practice.
309
 Baker relies in part on relational contract theory, which posits that the relationship of 
the parties, in this case the mother and sperm provider, yields the existence and terms of the 
contract.
310
 In her words, “[i]f the written agreement looks obviously different than the lived 
relationship, then the written agreement will have limited importance. In such a case one would 
look to the relationship itself to find terms.”
311
 
Richard Storrow advances a different perspective, but one that likewise bridges the 
seeming divide between “intent” and functional parenthood. He sees intent as an element of 
parental functioning.
312
 Dara Purvis, as well as Pamela Laufer-Ukeles and Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, 
similarly reject a categorical distinction between intent and functional parenting, finding that 
                                                                
practical, ‘as-designed-and-lived’ blueprints to resolve core family issues sacrifices simplicity and certainty, and these are 
not inconsequential losses”). 
305
 See W.R.L. v. A.H., No. 2014-CA-001240-ME, 2015 WL 1746240, at *8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015) (denying 
same sex co-parent who raised child with mother for four years and two additional years after separation standing to 
intervene in stepparent adoption by mother’s new husband). 
306
 See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text. 
307
 See infra Part III.E for further discussion of safeguards designed to weed out weak challenges by sperm 
providers. 
308
 Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology − The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental 
Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31−32 (2004) [hereinafter Bargaining]. 
309
 Id. at 35. 
310
 Id. at 41. 
311
 Id.  
312
 Storrow, supra note 7, at 665. 
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intent evidenced by post-birth caretaking equates to functional parenting.
313
 Thus neither theory 
nor doctrine inexorably supports prohibiting sperm donors from ascending to parental status based 
on functional parenting. 
Would any of the above analysis change if the case involved a sperm donor who had 
provided sperm to a woman to conceive a child to be raised with her lesbian partner? In certain 
respects, yes. From an empirical standpoint, it may be less likely that the sperm donor would 
actually assume the role of a true parent after the birth, given that the child already has a second 
parent—the partner. For this reason, we might expect even fewer cases where a sperm donor 
might colorably claim that contrary to the parties’ initial intent, he deserves to earn parental 
status.
314
 In the event he did assume such a role, a court would have to consider whether 
recognition would impact the mother’s partner’s parental status.
315
 
E. The Law Should Be Functional 
1. The law should provide clear and comprehensive rules governing the rights and responsibilities of 
parties using sperm from known providers 
As we have seen, many states lack any laws governing directed sperm donation outside 
the opposite-sex marriage context.
316
 This legislative and judicial vacuum leaves these families in 
legal limbo, creating uncertainty and rendering them prone to litigation to resolve any disputes 
that arise. This lack of clarity disserves children by injecting instability into their family 
arrangement and subjecting them to the high-conflict environment of litigation. If we know 
anything about child well-being, we know conflict over access by the adults in their lives does not 
promote it and can actively cause harm.
317
 The uncertainty of legal status likewise impairs the 
parental rights values of adult autonomy and fairness by subjecting the parties to a state–imposed 
status determination that may be at odds with their intentions and lives. 
Of course, no system can eliminate all uncertainty or completely prevent state 
interference. Any system of rules will require interpretation, and conflicts that require judicial (or 
other) dispute resolution will inevitably arise. Nonetheless, well-thought out and well-crafted 
statutes, combined with the option of contract and clear default rules, can bolster the stability of 
these families by protecting the parties’ expectations, enhancing certainty and predictability, and 
helping to minimize the need for litigation. 
                                                                
313
 Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 177, at 437 (aligning the use of intent with “allocating 
functional parenthood based on care”); Purvis, supra note 199, at 230 (describing K.M. as a case of assigning parentage 
based on “post-birth intent”). 
314
 We need to distinguish this scenario from another more realistic possibility—that the sperm provider 
and the couple intended that all act as parents to the child, perhaps even along with the sperm provider’s partner. This 
possibility prompts the question whether the law should recognize three parents, a question considered infra in Part IV. 
315
 See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
316
 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
317
 Amato, supra note 298, at 150−51; see also Baker, supra note 133, at 684−85 (explaining that children 
are often hurt by the actual conflict and animosity of divorce); Elrod, supra note 298, at 496−97 (referencing thirty years 
of research demonstrating detriment caused to children from high-conflict custody battles). 
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2. The law should promote clear statements of intent 
To this point, we have identified several specific principles that further the values of 
enhancing child well-being, respecting parental rights, and protecting pluralistic family forms. 
First, the law should provide clear rules delineating the parentage of children born through use of 
artificial insemination or IVF with gametes from someone known to the mother. Second, the law 
should not discriminate against unmarried individuals or couples. Third, the law should 
accommodate the variety of family forms as they actually operate—including recognizing special 
status for active sperm providers who do not function as parents but nonetheless can play a 
significant role in the child’s life, and identifying multiple legal parents in those circumstances 
where recognition is warranted. 
We know from the previous sections that in most situations, all of these values will be 
fostered by determining the rights and responsibilities of the parties based on their intent at the 
time of conception. Although I have argued that in certain unusual cases, a party should have the 
opportunity to establish that the donor has assumed parental status through conduct facilitated by 
the mother(s), the initial intent should be dispositive in most instances. An intent-based pre-
conception or pre-birth designation of parentage fosters child well-being by creating certainty and 
stability; serves parental rights and adult autonomy and privacy by clarifying and honoring the 
roles the participants expect to play in the child’s life; and allows families of various kinds to 
flourish.
318
 To incorporate functionality into our assessment, we need to start with how to craft 
rules that honor and encourage reliable expressions of intent. 
We also need to ensure that whatever rules we devise are known to and accessible by 
those using assisted reproduction to create their families. Too frequently, as we have seen, men 
and women proceed without comprehending the legal ramifications of their procreative 
choices.
319
 While no system can ensure that all those subject to the laws will know and understand 
them, we can and must do considerably better in this realm for the sake of all parties involved. 
Finally, we need to clarify the default rules in the event families proceed without clear 
expressions of intent. To do that requires a comprehensive solution that addresses assisted 
reproduction that takes place both within and outside a clinical setting. 
a. Written agreements should be enforceable 
The gold standard for expressing intent would rely on written agreements, ideally 
negotiated with the assistance of legal counsel. Written agreements can clarify the parties’ 
intention, reducing disputes about the roles and rights of the parties. They can also provide an 
important signaling effect, making the parties’ aware of the seriousness of the endeavor and, 
where lawyers are involved, ensuring that the parties enter into these arrangements thoughtfully 
and knowledgeably.
320
 
                                                                
318
 See Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 120 (noting “scholarly consensus” that “children and parents alike 
will be better off if parents are permitted to clarify parental status ex ante”); Zalesne, supra note 139, at 1030 (arguing that 
the goals of family law and contract law do not always conflict; contract law can expand the notion of family and protect 
family relationships). 
319
 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007); Bruce v. Boardwine, 770 S.E.2d 774, 775 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
320
 Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290, 295 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (purpose of written agreement for insemination 
is both evidentiary – as to avoid disputes over consent − and cautionary: “One who pauses to sign a document can be 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol19/iss1/3
FORMAN_FORMAT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/13/2016  9:28 AM 
2016] EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILIES CREATED WITH KNOWN SPERM PROVIDERS 91 
The use of written contracts between the donor and the intended parents is already 
considered essential in the egg donation context.
321
 As we saw, some parties using sperm for 
artificial insemination or IVF have also chosen to enter into written donor or co-parenting 
agreements, but the practice is not comparably well-established. Nonetheless, for those who 
choose to do so, the law should make clear that such agreements are enforceable and not 
considered against public policy.
322
 Given that sperm banks have long operated based on 
contractual relinquishment of parental rights largely without incident,
323
 no reason exists not to 
enforce donor agreements between known donors and their recipients that give up any claim to 
parentage by the donor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized this similarity in Ferguson, 
where it upheld the donor agreement against a claim for child support. The court could find no 
“legally sustainable distinction between the negotiated, clinical arrangement that closely mimics 
the trappings of anonymous sperm donation . . . and institutional sperm donation, itself.”
324
 
Of course, allowing men to relieve themselves of parental responsibility for children 
conceived by artificial insemination does stand in sharp contrast to the laws governing coital 
reproduction. Contracts purporting to waive a right to support for children conceived naturally 
have been routinely and universally invalidated.
325
 The value of coherence suggests that we treat 
coital reproduction and assisted reproduction the same way unless we can discern sufficient 
reasons to distinguish them. Here I would argue that this discrepancy does not support a rule 
prohibiting enforcement of donor agreements; rather, it may call for a reconsideration of the 
limitation on enforceability of prior written agreements between those reproducing naturally.
326
 
Scholars have questioned why biological paternity should automatically trigger a child 
                                                                
expected to give more thought to the consequences of consent than one who gives consent in a less formal setting”); see 
also Fiser, supra note 139, at 27 (noting that “[m]ost often, a great amount of thought. . .has occurred in AI cases,” leading 
some courts to “recognize[e] the intent of the parties in enforcing these parentage rights” and thus legitimizing the 
practice). For a discussion of the benefits, including signaling, of lawyer involvement in drafting ART-related documents, 
see Forman, supra note 210, at 434. 
321
 See, e.g., Egg Donors and Legal Contracts, AM. ACAD. OF ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. ATTY’S,, 
http://www.aaarta.org/aaarta/gametesembryo-donation/egg-donors-and-legal-contracts (last visited October 15, 2015). 
322
 Commentators generally agree on this point. See, e.g., Gill, supra note 241, at 1749; Polikoff, supra 
note 7, at 72; Jennifer Nadraus, Note, Dodging the Donor Daddy Drama: Creating a Model Statute for Determining 
Parental Status of Known Sperm Donors, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 180, 187 (2015). 
323
 Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 95 (noting “widespread consensus” that an agreement by an 
anonymous donor to give up parental status is “binding and enforceable”). 
324
 Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1247 (Pa. 2007). See also Fiser, supra note 139, at 24 
(characterizing contracts as contracts for donation of sperm, not paternity). 
325
 See, e.g., Budnick v. Silverman, 805 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (contract relieving 
man of child support and parental responsibilities unenforceable where child conceived naturally); Straub v. B.M.T., 626 
N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (court holds handwritten agreement relieving man of child support obligation and 
promising anonymity is against public policy and unenforceable where child is conceived naturally); Kesler v. Weniger, 
744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (parties cannot bargain away support if child is conceived by intercourse); Baker, 
supra note 133, at 701−02. Courts have likewise rejected attempts to avoid child support by men who were duped into 
thinking the woman was on birth control. See Piatt v. Schultz, No. 03-97-00142-CV, 1998 WL 476725, at *4 (Tex. App. 
1998). 
326
 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 59 (advocating creation of single parent or same sex couple-headed families 
regardless of method of conception). 
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support obligation.
327
 Some have argued that the legal system should uncouple support for 
children from parentage—at least to a degree. Instead, the primary obligation for ensuring 
adequate financial support could reside in the state, as it does in many other developed nations.
328
 
However, such a system has its drawbacks as well, and, more importantly is far from the system 
currently operating here. In the absence of such a regime, a compelling reason exists to assume 
that men who father children sexually are legally responsible for them, regardless of intent at the 
time of conception—to protect the many children who will need support, particularly those 
unplanned. Nonetheless, if the law is willing to relieve some biological progenitors of their 
support obligation, as it clearly has through the widespread acceptance of sperm donation, 
perhaps the law should allow those who conceive naturally to do the same when he and the 
mother(s) decide prior to conception that she will be a single parent or co-parent with a lesbian 
partner, as long as they reduce that agreement to a valid, written contract.
329
 
My intent here is merely to raise the question, not to advocate for the change, which 
requires further exploration. Moreover, the rule against enforcement of this kind of contract is so 
well entrenched that any change in this direction seems highly unlikely.
330
 Regardless, failure to 
achieve consistency with sexual reproduction on this point does not justify refusing to enforce 
donor agreements, as doing so would violate the other core precepts and deprive the parties of a 
very effective tool for safeguarding their families. 
Although some courts may resist allowing abdication of parental responsibility by 
contract, courts should have few qualms about enforcing an agreement that the sperm provider 
will act as a parent. Though co-parenting agreements by same-sex couples have proved 
controversial because they create parental rights in someone with no biological tie to the child or 
marital tie to the mother, and the family differs from the heterosexual norm,
331
 a co-parenting 
agreement between two biological parents simply clarifies that both parties intend the man to be a 
legal parent. If a man can acquire parental status by conceiving a child sexually, there is no reason 
to deny him the right to do so by artificial insemination. The court need not actually “enforce” the 
contract. It need only determine that the contract establishes his status as a parent.
332
 
                                                                
327
 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 157, at 365 (describing child support as a “‘tax’ on heterosexual 
intercourse that does not apply to conception by non-sexual means”); Baker, supra note 133, at 16−17 (questioning the 
benefits of positive paternity laws, given an “unwilling parent”). 
328
 See NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 130−32 (1997); Appleton, supra note 
157, at 363−64; Baker, supra note 133, at 692. 
329
 Women choosing to conceive sexually with someone who will have no parental rights may include 
single women as well as lesbian couples. See case discussed in Fiser, supra note 139, at note 7. I would not be in favor of 
allowing pre-conception extinguishment of parental rights for men conceiving naturally based only on a form. The risk of 
casual action seems too great. 
330
 One judge has gone on record supporting this approach. In an unusual opinion, the dissent in Straub v. 
B.M.T. argued that where the mother could fully support the child, the court should find the contract valid and enforceable. 
Straub v. B.M.T., 626 N.E.2d 848, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (Conover, J., dissenting). 
331
 See Forman, supra note 210, at 417 (discussing mixed results in cases concerning co-parenting 
agreements between same-sex partners); Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 93 (“[S]tates vary widely in their response to co-
parenting agreements.”).  
332
 See, e.g. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 718 (Va. 2013) (relying on contract and VAP to establish intent 
to parent, removing father from application of insemination statute); Forman, supra note 210, at 416−17, supra note 133, 
at 700-01 (noting controversy over enforcing contract versus using contract to establish intent). Cf. Abramowicz, supra 
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Providing limited rights to visitation or contact for the active sperm provider based on 
contract or some other written indicia of intent breaks newer ground, as no state expressly 
provides an opportunity for an active gamete provider to seek visitation. Although family law has 
enforced premarital agreements governing property and support and some “all-or-nothing” 
agreements in the assisted reproduction context, long-standing family principles hold that parents 
cannot contract in advance of a child’s birth about custody or visitation.
333
 However, the proposed 
contracts, like post-adoption contact agreements, would only be enforceable if they were deemed 
to be in the best interests of the child. Thus, these agreements would give standing to the active 
sperm provider, who otherwise would have none, to petition for visitation, and, as previously 
discussed, they might level the Troxel playing field.
334
 But the court would retain the right to deny 
visitation if it were not in the best interests of the child.
335
 
In most of the cases that involved an active sperm provider, the parties had no written 
agreement. Thus, a rule requiring a written contract for legal recognition would have left these 
active sperm providers without recourse. That troubles me greatly. Nonetheless, because such an 
agreement deviates significantly from both the ART and family law binary norm,
336
 and because 
the recipient would be ceding some quantum of constitutionally protected parental autonomy, the 
law should require the formality of a written agreement.
337
 A written document, clearly stating 
agreed-upon expectations of the role the sperm provider will play, increases the odds that the 
intended parents understand that they are yielding some of their rights and that the sperm provider 
understands that he will not acquire parental status. It also addresses the concern raised earlier that 
opening the door to claims by active sperm providers will invite attacks on family integrity or 
parental rights too readily. In time, experience may manifest the need for more flexibility on this 
issue in compelling cases, but at this point, insisting on a writing seems advisable. 
Similarly, any effort to vest more than two parents with parental rights must be premised 
on a written agreement of all parties, clearly expressing the expectation of co-equal parental rights 
and responsibilities. Otherwise, we risk obscuring the demarcation between “active sperm 
providers” and parents. Indeed, in the two cases recognizing a third parent, LaChapelle and 
Jacob, the courts may have overstepped in granting parental recognition to the sperm provider. In 
                                                                
note 186, at 94 (“In most of the states that take co-parenting agreements into account in allocating parental rights, courts 
do not enforce the agreements, but instead consider them as a factor relevant to assessing parental rights under a theory of 
de facto parentage.”); In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 920−21 (Tex. App. 2005) (court did not “enforce” contract but 
contract gave standing to bring paternity action).  
333
 Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 73−76. Indeed, the rule extends much further in many states, allowing 
a court to deny enforcement of custody or visitation agreements even after divorce or separation, unless they are in the best 
interests of the child. Id. at 80−81. 
334
 Cf. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 556-57 (Kan. 2013) (upholding co-parenting contract between 
same-sex partners and determining that biological mother had “waived” constitutional parental preference by agreeing to 
share custody). Cf. Maldonado, supra note 192, at 894 (arguing that proof of “quasi-parental” relationship should 
overcome the Troxel presumption that the parent is acting in the child’s best interest).  
335
 For an argument in favor of enforcing custody and visitation contracts between parents without 
reference to the best interests of the child, see Abramowicz, supra note 186, at 129−42. 
336
 See Zalesne, supra note 139, at 1081 (arguing that a contract can “fill the gap” for non-traditional 
families). 
337
 But see Polikoff, supra note 7, at 89 (arguing that sperm donor should have an opportunity to try to 
prove the right to visitation without a writing as long as terms are sufficiently definite). 
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LaChapelle, the contract at issue clearly demarcated the two lesbian partners as parents, assigning 
a “significant relationship” to the sperm provider.
338
 This language suggests that the parties 
intended LaChapelle to be an active sperm provider but not a co-equal parent.
339
 Similarly, Carlos 
Ball’s review of the trial transcript in Jacob led him to question whether the sperm provider 
deserved parental status.
340
 The mothers claimed they agreed prior to conception that he would 
not assume a parental role; his visits occurred monthly; and the mothers and child viewed him as 
an “uncle [or] friend.”
341
 Moreover, the courts’ decision in each of these cases to order the sperm 
provider to pay child support raises the specter of imposing an additional parent on single women 
or lesbian-headed families to satisfy gendered norms about the family that require a man.
342
 
The lines between “active sperm providers” and parents may well blur in both intent and 
in functional reality. To one person, a “significant relationship” may equate with parenthood; to 
another, it may signify a relationship of a different character. Careful drafting can help to 
ameliorate this problem. 
b. Using forms to define status 
While a written agreement should suffice to establish parental status, the law should also 
accept other clear written expressions of intent. Not all parties have the financial means or ability 
to access qualified legal counsel to assist them in drafting a customized donor or co-parenting 
agreement.
343
 Requiring the parties to draft an agreement would almost certainly increase the cost 
and burden imposed by the transaction. By contrast, a system of state-generated forms would add 
very little to the parties’ burden. 
States already have familiarity with using a form to designate parental status. As required 
by federal regulations, all states have created a form to allow a voluntary acknowledgment of 
paternity (VAP).
344
 A man can acquire presumed parental status merely by signing this form, as 
long as the mother signs as well and neither party rescinds within sixty days of the child’s birth.
345
 
VAPs do not depend on genetic fatherhood, so they present an easy way for a man who has no 
biological connection to the child to establish paternity, with the crucial caveat that the mother 
agrees.
346
 As we have seen, in several cases, courts gave significant weight to a fully executed 
                                                                
338
 See generally, LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
339
 But see Jacobs, supra note 158, at 327 (stating that “[a]ll three adults specifically contemplated a 
multiple-parenting arrangement”). See also Boskey, supra note 182, at 845−46, 853 (allowing acquisition of parental 
status based on post-birth conduct). 
340
 BALL, supra note 178, at 130. 
341
 Id. 
342
 Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 244 (2007). 
343
 Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1221 (2010) (discussed in Abramowicz supra note 186, at 114). 
344
 Leslie Joan Harris, A New Paternity Law for the Twenty-First Century: Of Biology, Social Function, 
Children’s Interests, and Betrayal, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297, 313 (2007). 
345
 Id. (noting after 60 days, a party wishing to rescind must show fraud, duress, or material mistake of 
fact).  
346
 Id. at 329. 
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VAP in finding that the sperm provider was a legal parent.
347
 
However, California expressly invalidates voluntary declarations of paternity signed by 
sperm donors who provide sperm under the supervision of a physician.
348
 In light of constitutional 
concerns with such complete-bar statutes, the provision prohibiting sperm donors from validating 
a voluntary declaration of paternity seems at first glance ill advised. Since VAPs require both 
parents to sign, they would provide an easy mechanism for a couple intending to parent together 
to document that intent, regardless of whether they used a physician. Interestingly, the VAP 
exclusion was adopted when the legislature amended § 7613(b) to allow a sperm provider to 
avoid donor status if the mother and sperm provider agree in writing.
349
 The drafters may have 
wanted to prohibit acquisition of parental status by the donor after the child was conceived, as the 
amended insemination statute requires that the agreement avoiding donor status precede the 
child’s conception.
350
 By contrast, VAPs can be signed at any time, including after the child’s 
birth.
351
 
If the parties agree after conception, why should the law not honor that change of 
intention, at least when it expands the universe of persons committed to and responsible for the 
child? Doing so might cause problems where another person already occupies the “second parent” 
role, particularly for lesbian couples. If the couple splits up, the biological mother might convince 
the donor to sign a VAP in an effort to shut out the former partner. Existing law provides a partial 
safeguard against this turn of events: VAPs signed by a father are invalid if a presumed parent 
already exists.
352
 However, this protection does not extend to presumed parents under § 7611(d)—
those who qualify because they received the child into their home and held him out as their own. 
A same-sex partner who has neither married nor entered into a registered domestic partnership 
with the mother nor been named on the birth certificate would thus be vulnerable to challenge of 
her parental status if the mother and sperm provider signed a VAP.
353
 We would hope that a judge 
evaluating the “competing presumptions” created by 7611(d) and a late-in-the-day VAP would 
find that the presumption in favor of the partner (assuming she had acted as the parent, while the 
donor had not) was “weightier” in terms of “policy and logic,” the standard used by the court to 
resolve conflicting parenting presumptions.
354
 But allowing use of the VAP would open the door 
to a challenge of this sort, subjecting the co-parent to possible loss of parental status or at least the 
cost of defending her parental rights. 
The VAP thus provides at best an imperfect vehicle for determining the status of the 
sperm provider. A better approach would tailor the form to the circumstances. Indeed, California 
had already taken a step in this direction by approving the use of forms to satisfy its “agree in 
writing” requirement to establish parentage when used by a sperm provider who donates under 
                                                                
347
 See supra note 48-52 and accompanying text. 
348
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(d) (West 2015). 
349
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2015). 
350
 Id. 
351
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2015). 
352
 Id.  
353
 Id. at § 7612. 
354
 Id. at § 7612(b). 
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physician supervision.
355
 Unfortunately, the forms, like the underlying statute, only applied to 
sperm provided under physician supervision.
356
 They did not reach those opting for in-home 
insemination, leaving those families with a sperm provider who could claim parental status at any 
time, regardless of the parties’ intent or conduct.
357
 
Recently passed legislation in California that revised the state’s artificial insemination 
statute remedied this flaw by clarifying the rights of the parties in both situations.
358
 Providing the 
semen to a licensed physician is no longer the only way to ensure donor status. The next section 
considers the advisability of such a rule change and what role, if any, physicians should play in 
sorting out the legal status of the parties. 
c. Physicians are useful but not essential 
As we have seen, a number of states have statutes that define the rights of parties using 
gamete donation only if the procedure occurs under the supervision of a physician. This approach 
makes sense for those using assisted reproduction in whole or in part because of fertility 
problems. A woman who needs intrauterine insemination or IVF to conceive will of necessity 
involve a physician. However, even for those individuals transferring gametes in a clinical setting, 
some existing statutes define the rights and responsibilities of the parties too narrowly—
classifying all those providing sperm for insemination of a non-spouse as donors. As this has 
proved problematic, any rules tied to a clinic setting must offer options for those giving gametes 
to another with the intent to parent as well as those intending to extinguish any potential parental 
rights. 
Moreover, for artificial insemination, we know that many choose not to engage a 
physician. In some cases, the women may not have a choice where physicians and clinics 
continue to discriminate against unmarried women and lesbians.
359
 Others may not have the 
financial means to engage a physician for insemination, which can run thousands of dollars if 
multiple attempts are necessary and will not likely be covered by insurance.
360
 
Some may argue for rules that discourage in-home insemination, as a clinical setting 
offers certain advantages. Physician involvement serves an important function in screening the 
                                                                
355
 Id. at § 7613.5. California has considerable experience using forms for other aspects of assisted 
reproduction. Under the California Probate Code, to be considered the legal father of posthumously-conceived children, a 
man must have made a specific, written declaration permitting use of his gametes for posthumous reproduction. CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2015). California has generated forms containing the requisite language. WEST’S CAL. CODE 
FORMS, PROBATE § 249.5 Form 1 (7th ed.). 
356
 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (“WARNING: Signing this form does not terminate the parentage claim of a 
sperm donor. A sperm donor’s claim to parentage is terminated if the sperm is provided to a licensed physician or surgeon 
or to a licensed sperm bank prior to insemination as required by Section 7613(b) of the Family Code.”). 
357
 See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 537−38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding donor is legal 
father because semen not provided to physician per statute). 
358
 CA Assemb. B. No. 960, Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015-16). 
359
 Daar, supra note 151, at 43−46; Fiser, supra note 139, at 5; Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust 
Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 208−10 (2003). 
360
 Nadraus, supra note 322, at 188−89. 
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semen sample for transmissible diseases and can offer other services, such as genetic testing, that 
may prove beneficial.
361
 A physician also acts as a point of contact, as we will see, that can 
provide important record keeping.
362
 The choice to use a physician may also signal that the parties 
have given due consideration to the decision to procreate in this fashion.
363
 
Performing artificial insemination in a clinical setting undoubtedly has the potential to 
offer these benefits, but the advantages are not compelling enough to mandate that those using 
assisted reproduction procreate under the care of a physician or risk family law limbo. Individuals 
who procreate sexually expose themselves to sexually transmitted diseases and might benefit from 
genetic testing, but we leave those matters to their discretion. The “point of contact” and signaling 
arguments better reflect the unique challenges of assisted reproduction, but they cannot outweigh 
the infringement of the individuals’ procreative autonomy. A requirement of physician 
involvement would also exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, barriers to access to treatment by 
single women and lesbians including cost and discrimination based on marital status or sexual 
orientation. 
Moreover, as the cases demonstrate, use of a physician does not guarantee that conflict 
regarding familial intentions will not arise. To the contrary, features of the doctor-patient 
relationship may contribute to confusion, rather than prevent it. In some of the cases, the parties 
signed clinic consent forms that one party later challenged as a basis for discerning his or her 
intent.
364
 The courts have viewed these forms with some ambivalence, and rightly so.
365
 Drafted 
by or on behalf of physicians, clinic consent forms aim to fulfill doctors’ legal obligation to obtain 
informed consent from their patients. They typically contain detailed information about the 
medical procedure and its risks and may say little or nothing about the family law ramifications of 
                                                                
361
 Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating screening for hereditary or 
communicable diseases as one justification for requiring a physician’s involvement). 
362
 Id. at 535 (stating involvement of third-party such as doctor can create “formal, documented structure 
for the donor-recipient relationship, without which . . . misunderstandings between the parties . . . would be more likely to 
occur.”). 
363
 See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that physician 
involvement “goes a long way toward preventing last-minute decisions[,]” which might reflect “spur-of-the-moment” 
decision to relieve donor of parental responsibility). From a traditional standpoint, the physician requirement may also 
serve a symbolic function. Transporting the act of conception from the interpersonal realm to a clinical setting may make 
it easier to extinguish the “donor’s” parental rights. 
364
 Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (sperm provider claimed 
consent form identifying him as “intended parent” demonstrated intent to parent; mother disagreed); K.M. v. E.G., 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 61, 72 (Cal. 2005) (woman who provided egg for child carried to term by partner disputed applicability of “egg 
donor” form she signed).  
365
 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798 (court gives no weight to consent form identifying sperm provider 
and mother as “intended parents;” holds form would not meet “agreed to in a writing” requirement under amended 
California statute); K.M., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 72 (finding consent form identifying egg provider as donor invalid in this 
situation because she intended to raise child with partner in joint home); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 347 (Fla. 
2013) (court holds genetic mother who provided egg to partner who gave birth to child is legal parent despite consent 
form); In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2009) (egg provider who intends to co-parent 
with recipient birth mother not barred from establishing parentage by signing clinic waiver required to obtain treatment); 
Herman v. Lennon, 776 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779−80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (clinic consent signed by boyfriend of mother 
inseminated with sperm from anonymous donor not a contract and inapplicable to establish boyfriend’s parentage). 
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the treatment.
366
 Moreover, doctors cannot offer legal advice. Without guidance, patients may 
believe that these forms settle the matter of parentage. 
Perhaps more importantly, there is no practical way to prevent women from performing 
the insemination outside the doctor’s office. As some women prefer this method, their procreative 
choices merit respect and their families deserve appropriate legal rules. Moreover, the men who 
donate may have no knowledge of the method of conception used by the women or no ability to 
control it, as was apparently the case with William Marotta.
367
 Thus any functional regime must 
encompass rules that address the rights of the parties regardless of where the procedure took place 
or by what non-coital means, whether IVF, IUI or turkey baster. 
That is not to say, though, that the rules cannot vary or that physicians do not have a 
meaningful role to play. On the plus side, for those who choose to use them, physicians have a 
unique opportunity to serve as a conduit for information, not by acting as lawyers themselves or 
through their consent forms, but by connecting their patients to resources. They can make the 
state forms available and can, and should, encourage their patients to seek legal advice, as the 
forms themselves do. Precedent already exists for enlisting physicians in this kind of task. 
California Health & Safety Code § 1644.7 requires any entity receiving genetic material for 
conception to provide the depositor with a form that would satisfy the Probate Code’s condition 
for posthumous use of the material.
368
 A similar provision could effectively minimize disputes 
about the parties’ intentions at the time of conception, a significant source of later conflict. Once 
use of the forms becomes common practice, we could expect that conflicts between gamete 
providers and recipients who used a physician would greatly diminish. In the (hopefully) rare 
event that patients did not sign a form (or other writing) indicating their intent, courts would have 
to consider other means of divining the parties’ intent and determining parentage, a subject 
discussed next. 
d. Rules for in-home insemination 
A set of forms denominating the intent of the parties should prove equally binding for 
those choosing to inseminate outside a clinical setting who do not want to incur the cost of a 
customized negotiated agreement. However, without the physician as point of contact, women 
opting for the “do-it-yourself” approach—and the men they recruit to donate or co-parent—might 
remain unaware of the forms. To ameliorate this problem, they could be made available in places 
where women are likely to seek information. Most women choosing to conceive via artificial 
                                                                
366
 See Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798. For a comprehensive discussion of the problems inherent in 
using medical consent forms to resolve legal issues in assisted reproduction, see generally, Forman, supra note 210.  
367
 Nadraus, supra note 322, at 189. Uncertainty about the method of conception was observed in several 
of the cases. See, e.g., C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ohio Misc. 1994) (parties disputed whether AI was conducted 
under supervision of physician); R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (sperm provider was under 
the impression that woman used his sample to conceive when she actually used an anonymous donation). 
368
 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.7 (West 2015). I have been sharply critical of relying on 
physician-generated consent forms regarding embryo disposition. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 210 at 379, 442-43. Thus I 
am advocating use of a state-generated form, separate and distinct from any medical consent forms signed by the parties in 
connection with undergoing treatment. In my work on embryo disposition, I also argued for a number of procedural 
safeguards as a prerequisite to enforcement of embryo disposition contracts. Features unique to that context make those 
protections critical. By contrast, in this context, the need for clarity from the time of conception elevates ease of use in 
balancing the various concerns. 
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insemination likely engage in some kind of research prior to embarking on the process, even if 
“research” means a Google search.
369
 As many of those choosing in-home insemination are 
lesbians, LGBT advocacy and support groups could provide links to the forms, as could 
organizations offering information and support for non-traditional families and those struggling 
with infertility, such as Path2Parenthood and Resolve.
370
 States that adopted an approved form 
could also make it available on their family law self-help websites, which typically contain 
information about establishing parentage and child support.
371
 The American Bar Association and 
state and local bar associations might also help to educate the public.
372
 Hopefully, well-crafted 
state-generated documents would obviate the use of poorly drafted “contracts” floating through 
cyberspace. 
3. Default rules in the absence of a written statement of intent 
Despite these efforts, some sperm providers and recipients undoubtedly will fail to use 
the forms or any other written agreement, whether through ignorance, carelessness or 
intentionally. Even those using a physician may end up conceiving without having executed their 
intent in writing. Physicians may not feel comfortable conditioning treatment on providing a 
written declaration of intent (outside of their consent forms), though best practices require them to 
do so for other types of assisted reproduction, such as surrogacy. Even if physicians are required 
to offer the form to their patients, physicians, like all, are fallible. Some patients will simply fall 
through the cracks. How then should the law determine parentage in the absence of a writing 
declaring the parties’ intent? What default rules should govern in the event that the parties do not 
provide written evidence of their intent? 
Some would argue that the default rule should presume that the sperm provider is the 
father. This rule has the benefit of consistency with the rules governing coital reproduction. A 
man who conceives a child sexually is generally considered the father based on biology alone, 
certainly for child support purposes, even if he had no ongoing relationship with the mother. The 
law strongly favors identifying two parents who will take responsibility for the child, so this rule 
arguably furthers our value of maximizing child welfare as well.
373
 
However, in many of the home insemination cases, the child had two parents—the 
mother and her same-sex partner. Presumably if the two were married at the time the child was 
conceived, the sperm provider could be treated as any other biological father seeking to assert 
                                                                
369
 A simple Google search, “sperm donor forms,” pulled up a link to the California sperm donor form on 
the first page of results. 
370
 See, e.g., LGBT Family Building, PATH2PARENTHOOD, http://www.path2parenthood.org/family-
building/lgbt-family-building/ (last visited May 25, 2015), and Family Building Options, RESOLVE: THE NAT’L 
INFERTILITY ASS’N, http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/ (last visited May 25, 2015).  
371
 See, e,g., California Courts, Families & Children, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/selfhelp-family.htm (last visited May 25, 2015), Court Help, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED COURT SYS. (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/, and Family Law & Self Help Information, FLA. COURTS, 
http://www.flcourts.org/resources-and-services/family-courts/family-law-self-help-information/ (last visited May 25, 
2015). 
372
 Nadraus, supra note 322, at 191. 
373
 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 241, at 953 (arguing that law should ensure that donor-conceived children 
have two parents for inheritance purposes). 
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parental rights when the child is born into an existing marriage. In such a case, the husband (or 
spouse) would typically be presumed to be the child’s legal father and the biological father (sperm 
provider in this situation) would have no parental rights or responsibilities.
374
 However, many 
states now permit the biological father to rebut the marital presumption under certain 
circumstances.
375
 Moreover, the marital presumption obviously would not protect in any way a 
same-sex co-parent who was not married to the mother, thus undermining our goal of promoting 
pluralism. 
Likewise, for single women intending to parent solo, using a default rule in favor of 
parentage arguably denigrates their choice of family structure by imposing a societal norm at odds 
with their intent and with our goal of promoting pluralism. Single parents can and do raise 
children and do it well. Given that the right to procreate extends to single persons as well as 
unmarried individuals, a refusal to allow single parent status for a woman using a known donor 
might raise constitutional concerns.
376
 However, men providing sperm with the intent to parent or 
who have assumed that role might just as easily argue that the opposite default rule—that they are 
merely donors—violates their choice to procreate as an unmarried man and potentially infringes 
their constitutional right to parent. Hence the pluralism argument does not help us resolve this 
stalemate when single women are involved. 
In deciding which rule to prefer, it might be helpful to have data on which arrangement is 
more common—single women hoping to parent alone, or two individuals—whether romantically 
involved or not—expecting to parent together. With such information, we might choose a default 
rule that aligns most closely with the more common arrangement, thus protecting children from 
the negative consequences of unnecessary litigation and preserving parental rights. However, no 
such data exists. Nor does any data exist about the intentions of lesbian couples using known 
donors, though we might reasonably surmise that in many cases they intend to parent 
exclusively.
377
 Although a significant number of the lesbian couple cases contemplated sperm 
provider involvement as a non-parent, the incidence of lesbian couples who truly intend to enter 
into a multi-parent arrangement with both the partner and the sperm provider having parental 
status is likely much rarer. Perhaps if there were some precedent for recognition of three (or 
more) parents, this arrangement would proliferate, but at this point, single or dual parent 
households likely dominate the demographic landscape. Beyond this conclusion, we should 
exercise caution in making assumptions about which arrangements are more likely. As for the 
sperm provider serving as role model, we have already addressed the need for that status to be 
established based on written agreement. 
Existing law can provide some help in choosing between these presumptions. To perfect 
                                                                
374
 See supra note 8-10 and accompanying text. But see Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 474 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 2014) (holding marital presumption was not applicable to a lesbian married couple where the spouse could not be 
biological parent and biological father was seeking paternity). 
375
 See supra note 8-10 and accompanying text. 
376
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Charles W. Adamson, Assisted Reproductive 
Techniques: When Is Sperm Donor A Dad?, 8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 279, 293−94 (2009).  
377
 See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 63 (an “overwhelming number of lesbians choosing known donors do not 
expect to share parental rights with the donor.”); Id. at 88 (discussing anthropological and psychological insights regarding 
lesbian families); Kelly, supra note 19, at 204 (ten of twelve lesbian couple families in Canadian study envisioned donor 
role as something other than parent; two of twelve had “donors” acting as parents, but without legal status and with 
mothers considered “primary parents.”). 
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a constitutional claim to parentage, the sperm provider would need to demonstrate that he had 
come forward to fully accept the responsibilities of parenthood.
378
 Moreover, we know that 
biology will not suffice to establish legal parentage for unwed fathers in certain contexts. As we 
saw above, a man who fathers a child with a woman already married to someone else may not 
acquire parental status because the woman’s husband is presumed to be the legal father.
379
 Also, if 
a mother wishes to relinquish the child for adoption, a biological father’s consent will not 
automatically be required. Usually, the father has to take some affirmative action, such as filing 
with a putative father’s registry, demonstrating a commitment to parenting, or bringing an action 
to establish paternity, before he will be considered a full legal father.
380
  So even if we accept that 
a man who provides sperm with the intent to parent should have an avenue to earn that status, the 
law need not presume that he acquires parentage just by virtue of donating his sperm. The 
question is what the law should require. 
Some would argue that all that is constitutionally required is to allow a man some 
method of demonstrating intent to parent,
381
 and a state could insist that the man agree in writing 
to that method. The Kansas Supreme Court took this view in In re K.M.H. 
382
 Kansas’ 
insemination statute provides that a donor of semen to a licensed physician for use by someone 
other than his wife is not a parent “unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman.”
383
 
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the statute in the face of a constitutional challenge brought by 
a man who claimed he provided sperm to a friend based on an oral agreement that granted him 
parental rights.
384
  The sperm provider, D.H., alleged violations both of equal protection and due 
process. As the court acknowledged, men and women are treated differently under the statute. 
Men have to act affirmatively (executing a writing with the agreement of the woman) to establish 
parentage, while women are parents under all circumstances. Applying heightened scrutiny, the 
court found that the law nonetheless did not violate equal protection. The court first opined that 
biological differences between men and women related to child bearing rendered them not 
similarly situated. However, even assuming that they were, the court found that the distinction 
served several important state objectives and that the law was substantially related to achieving 
those ends. Specifically, a “requirement that any such agreement be in writing enhances 
predictability, clarity, and enforceability.”
385
 The court also saw benefit in the design of the 
statute, which “implicitly encourages early resolution of the elemental question of whether a 
donor will have parental rights,” even though it does not expressly address the timing “of entry 
                                                                
378
 Lehr v. Robertson, 436 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). 
379
 See supra notes 8, 374 and accompanying text. 
380
 Forman, supra note 215, at 1001−08. 
381
 See supra notes 56–58, 97-103, 155-56 and accompanying text for cases holding a complete statutory 
ban on claiming parentage based on artificial insemination unconstitutional where men intended to parent. 
382
 In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1038, 1040-41 (Kan. 2007). 
383
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(f) (2007) (current version at §23-2208(f)). For examples of other state 
statutes containing a similar provision, see WEST’S ANN CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b); WEST’S D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
909(e)(2); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(b); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:17-44(b); VERNON’S TEX. CODE ANN., FAM. CODE § 
160-7031; WEST’S WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.705. 
384
 K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1040−41. 
385
 Id. at 1039. 
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into a written agreement.”
386
 As the court observed, “[e]ffectively, the parties must decide 
whether they will enter into a written agreement before any donation is made, while there is still 
balanced bargaining power on both sides of the parenting equation.”
387
 This structure served the 
“admirable” goal of “[e]ncouraging careful consideration of entry into parenthood” and the 
“worthy” goal of avoiding the “legal limbo” experienced by D.H.
388
 
Of course the option of a written agreement varying the default rule of non-parentage did 
not actually prevent D.H. from landing in legal limbo because he ostensibly did not know about it. 
Indeed, the mother in this case was a lawyer while D.H. was not, suggesting unequal bargaining 
power, at least in terms of knowledge of the law. The court nonetheless held that D.H.’s ignorance 
of the law did not render the statute violative of his due process rights.
389
 However, even if the 
court was correct on this constitutional point, it does highlight an issue that needs to be carefully 
considered in formulating rules governing use of gametes from known providers if we hope to 
further the value of functionality.
390
 
Although the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the requirement of a written 
agreement to assume parental status in this context was constitutional, it did question the scheme 
as a policy matter, noting the desirability of maximizing a child’s chance of having two parents—
and the resources that go with them.
391
 The court also noted the desire of donor offspring to know 
their roots and the trend in other countries toward prohibiting anonymous donation, but concluded 
that the weighing and balancing of these concerns rested with the legislature.
392
 
Two judges dissented. Justice Caplinger argued that the statute allowed men to lose their 
parental rights through inaction, and that waivers of fundamental constitutional rights require 
affirmative conduct.
393
 He also objected to the majority’s failure to attach legal significance to 
D.H.’s ignorance of the law, distinguishing Lehr because it involved an adoption proceeding 
where the parental status determination takes on an urgency not present here.
394
 In Justice 
Caplinger’s view, D.H. had “come forward to participate in the rearing of his children,” and thus 
met the Lehr standard for asserting parental rights.
395
 The state’s desire for clarity and certainty 
cannot justify infringing the sperm provider’s constitutional rights.
396
 Justice Hill chimed in to 
inquire about the interests of the children: “None of the elaborate and meticulous safeguards our 
Kansas laws afford parents and children in proceedings before our courts when confronted with 
                                                                
386
 Id.  
387
 Id.  
388
 Id.  
389
 Id. at 1033, 1040−41. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983) (father’s failure to register with 
putative father registry due to ignorance of law does not make statute unconstitutional). 
390
 See supra notes 145, 316-17 and accompanying text. 
391
 K.M.H. at 1041. 
392
 K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1041−42. 
393
 Id. at 1046 (Caplinger, J., dissenting). 
394
 Id. at 1048 (Caplinger, J., dissenting). 
395
 Id. at 1049 (Caplinger, J., dissenting). 
396
 Id. at 1050 (Caplinger, J., dissenting). 
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questions of parentage have been extended to these children.”
397
 
The K.M.H. majority likely has the better argument than the dissent on the 
constitutionality of the written requirement to establish parental rights.
398
 Unmarried men have 
virtually never been similarly situated with unmarried women when it comes to establishing 
parental rights. Since Lehr, the mere biological connection of the man with his offspring has not 
sufficed to establish his fundamental constitutional right to parent, though it has more than 
sufficed to recognize his parental responsibilities.
399
 Perfecting that right requires affirmative 
conduct demonstrating the man’s commitment to parent, and the state can require that the man 
assert his commitment in a particular way, such as by sending a postcard to a putative father’s 
registry, as in Lehr, or signing a written agreement, as in K.M.H. Nonetheless, constitutional does 
not necessarily equate with wise, as even the K.M.H. majority conceded.
400
 
To insist on a writing to establish parental status risks injustice in too many cases. Recall 
that in a number of cases, the parties alleged oral agreements, backed up by conduct, to assert a 
claim for parent status. Rather, the law would establish a rebuttable presumption that the sperm 
provider is a donor unless he can prove that he donated with the intent to parent by clear and 
convincing evidence, or that he has developed an actual father-child relationship, as discussed in 
connection with Jason P. Some may attack the proposed rule for disadvantaging men who intend 
to parent, by imposing a difficult barrier to surmount.
401
 Nonetheless, the heightened burden of 
proof provides necessary protection from frivolous claims. Once we move beyond the realm of 
written understanding, it becomes perilously easy for one party to simply claim that the sperm 
provider intended to parent, compelling the other party to defend against the claim, even if the 
party seeking to classify the sperm provider as parent does not have sufficient evidence to prevail. 
Critics from the opposite perspective may contend that allowing sperm providers to 
attempt to establish parentage based on anything other than written agreement invites challenges 
to the mother’s rights and threatens the integrity of non-traditional families and the child’s well-
being by promoting uncertainty and litigation. There are several responses to this claim. First, if 
the sperm provider truly intended to parent from the time of conception or assumed the role of 
parent with the mother’s consent, denying him the opportunity to prove that fact only protects one 
parent’s rights and a false version of the “non-traditional” family. As for the child’s well-being, 
unfortunately the law must balance the perils of conflict between the parents against the benefit 
that will accrue to the child from a continued relationship with or support by her father. Lastly, 
viewed as a whole, the legal structure proposed here is designed to minimize the number of cases 
that involve such disputes by encouraging and facilitating written statements of intent. 
III. CONCLUSION 
My goal here has been to shine a light on existing problems in the states’ approaches to 
                                                                
397
 Id. at 1051 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
398
 See Polikoff, supra note 7, at 68 (requiring written contract to establish donor as father would be 
constitutional). 
399
 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
400
 K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1041. 
401
 For a discussion of the differential burdens imposed on gay men seeking to parent, see Levy, supra note 
179 and accompanying text. 
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families created through artificial insemination or other assisted reproductive technologies using 
gametes provided by others, and to develop a set of guiding values and essential principles to 
shape the law’s approach to these challenging issues. The current treatment of directed donation 
varies widely from state to state and often leaves the parties without clear guidance about their 
respective roles, rights, and responsibilities. No state currently has a statutory scheme that 
encompasses all the features of the proposed regime. As we know, many states have no statutory 
law addressing gamete donation. Of the more than half that do, most address only the rights of 
opposite-sex married couples using sperm donation. Fewer have expanded coverage to address 
the needs of single parents. Only one state has enabled by statute a third person to claim parental 
status. Moreover, the vast majority contemplate use of a physician either explicitly or by defining 
assisted reproduction in terms of use of medical technology.
402
 
Thus existing statutory schemes have a considerable way to go to meet the principles 
outlined here. While case law has at times filled in the gap, in many cases, the parties were left 
with a legal determination that failed to reflect either the intent of the participants or the reality of 
their family life. To serve the values of promoting child well-being, parental rights, and adult 
autonomy and pluralism, the law must start by clarifying who is a donor and who is a parent 
based on the parties’ intent, not whether the parties used a physician or a medical procedure to 
conceive. The practice of in-home insemination is simply too easy and too common to leave those 
families and gamete providers operating in a legal vacuum. In addition, existing statutes often 
limit the familial options even for those who do use medical assistance, defining all providers of 
gametes to unmarried recipients as “donors,” regardless of the parties’ intent. These restrictive 
laws lead to litigation and constitutional challenges. The revised Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) 
seemingly addressed these problems. Section 703 classifies a man who provides sperm for 
assisted reproduction with the intent to be a parent as a parent. Thus intent, rather than marital 
status, determines parentage. The comments further explain that the revised UPA eliminates the 
physician requirement. However, the revised UPA requires that the consent to parent be in 
writing, unless the man lives with the woman and child for the first two years of the child’s life. 
These restrictions would leave no room for an oral agreement or parental conduct short of 
cohabitation to establish intent. More importantly, although a number of states now have 
provisions similar to these, in several, they have defined “assisted reproduction” in a way that 
reinserts the physician requirement or leaves the question ambiguous. 
A recently adopted amendment to California’s gamete donation law does a better job of 
accomplishing these goals. California Assembly Bill No. 960 covers use of either eggs or 
sperm.
403
 Although I do not agree with all of its particulars, it represents a move in the right 
direction. The statute clarifies that the intended parents will be considered the legal parents and 
that a donor providing sperm through a physician will not be considered a parent unless he and 
the mother agree otherwise in writing.
404
 Critically, the law also contains a provision stating that if 
semen is not provided to a physician or sperm bank, the sperm provider is nonetheless still 
considered a donor with no parental rights if the parties agree in writing or the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that prior to conception, the sperm provider and woman had an oral 
                                                                
402
 See supra notes 8, 18, 146 and accompanying text. See also In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 
1260−61 (Pa. 2010) (court required physician involvement for donor status in absence of statute). 
403
 Assemb. B. 960, 2015-16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (amending sections 7613 and 7613.5 of the 
California Family Code). 
404
 Id. at § 7613(a). 
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agreement that he would not be a parent.
405
 Thus the statute would retain the default rule that the 
man was a parent if the child was conceived by artificial insemination outside a clinical setting. I 
have argued for the opposite default rule, but at least the California law provides clarity for the 
parties undertaking in-home insemination. It offers a set of forms to facilitate written expressions 
of intent.
406
 
However, the California bill does not create a space for a reservation of rights by the 
active sperm provider. The law must expand its options for those gamete providers who agree to 
donate based on an understanding that they will play a continued, but non-parental role in the 
child’s. This change may go against the post-Troxel trend toward restricting third-party visitation, 
but it is neither precluded by that case nor inconsistent with all existing third-party visitation 
statutes. Fixing the boundaries defining the active sperm provider has proven particularly vexing. 
We may find that we need a more expansive approach that moves beyond intent or allows other 
non-written indicia of intent to suffice. Until such time arrives (if it does), recognition of the 
active sperm provider under the terms presented would mark a significant improvement over the 
current binary regime. 
Likewise, some families may contemplate that both the sperm provider and a spouse or 
partner will take on a parental role, along with the other biological parent. The law should honor 
these intentions if the parties have agreed in writing. Specific decisions regarding custody, 
visitation, and child support responsibilities would be decided in accordance with the best 
interests of the child. Allowing limited rights for the active sperm provider and opening the door 
to multiple legal parents surely require the greatest legal leap of the suggested reforms, and even 
the less controversial proposals would require significant change in many jurisdictions. Yet these 
families deserve a legal regime that meets their needs. Finally, a designation of donor status at the 
time of conception, whether established by written declaration or through operation of the default 
rules, should not preclude a finding that the donor has achieved the status of parent by truly 
functioning as such. 
Many of the suggested changes have required a difficult and delicate balancing of serious 
concerns at stake for all parties, and which can and should be debated. No legal scheme can 
achieve perfection or prevent the need for dispute resolution for all cases, but the law can create 
rules that allow families of various configurations to thrive, that provide considerably more 
certainty of legal status, and that allow access to dispute resolution when necessary. We should 
strive to accomplish those goals. 
 
                                                                
405
 Id. at § 7613(2). 
406
 Id. at § 7613.5. The bill contains one sample form for those intending to be donors and one for those 
intending to be parents. These forms, like the VAP, would require both parties to sign. By the terms of the statute, these 
forms would satisfy the requirement that the parties’ state their intent regarding parentage in writing, though the statute 
does not mandate their use. 
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